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The international community has declared poverty 
reduction one of the fundamental objectives of 
development, and therefore a metric for assessing the 
effectiveness of development interventions. This creates 
the need for a sound understanding of the fundamental 
factors that account for observed variations in poverty 
outcomes either over time or across space. Consistent 
with the view that such an understanding entails deeper 
micro empirical work on growth and distributional 
change, this paper reviews existing decomposition 
methods that can be used to identify sources of 
variation in poverty. The maintained hypothesis is that 
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the living standard of an individual is a pay-off from 
her participation in the life of society. In that sense, 
individual outcomes depend on endowments, behavior 
and the circumstances that determine the returns to 
those endowments in any social transaction. To identify 
the contribution of each of these factors to changes in 
poverty, the statistical and structural methods reviewed 
in this paper all rely on the notion of ceteris paribus 
variation. This entails the comparison of an observed 
outcome distribution to a counterfactual obtained by 
changing one factor at a time while holding all the other 
factors constant. 
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Poverty reduction is one of the key objectives of socioeconomic development.  The 
first World Development Report (WDR) argued that development efforts should be aimed 
at the twin objectives of rapid growth and poverty reduction1 (World Bank 1978).  This 
vision of development has been reiterated in one form or another in subsequent reports 
culminating in a conception of development as opportunity equalization presented in WDR 
2006 (World Bank 2005).  In this context, equity is defined in terms of a level playing field 
where  individuals  have  equal  opportunities  to  pursue  freely  chosen  life  plans  and  are 
spared from extreme deprivation in outcomes.  In this sense, the pursuit of equity also 
entails that of poverty reduction. 
A recent review of poverty trends across the world has shown that poverty had 
been on a steady decline for a wide variety of countries from the late 1990s up until 2009 
(when the financial crisis hit the world economy).  The evidence on inequality reduction, a 
key  determinant  of  poverty  outcomes,  is  however  mixed.    From  the  policymaking 
perspective, it is important to understand the factors driving these observed outcomes. 
Focusing on the fact that distributional statistics are computed on the basis of a 
distribution of the living standards which is fully characterized by its mean and the degree 
of  inequality,  several  authors  have  proposed  counterfactual  decomposition  methods  to 
identify the contribution of changes in the mean and in inequality to variations in overall 
poverty.  These decompositions include the Datt-Ravallion (1992) method, which splits the 
change  in  poverty  into  distribution-neutral  growth  effect,  a  redistributive  effect  and  a 
residual interpreted as an interaction term.  The Shapley method proposed by Shorrocks 
(1999) is analogous to that of Datt and Ravallion, but does not involve a residual.  Kakwani 
(2000) has proposed an equivalent approach.  Ravallion and Huppi (1991) offer a way of 
decomposing change in poverty over time into intrasectoral effects, a component due to 
population shifts and an interaction term between sectoral changes and population shifts.  
We present a detailed review of all these macro methods in the appendix. 
                                                           
1 This recommendation is consistent with the theme underlying the study of redistribution with growth by Chenery 
et al. (1974).  This study advocates the use of explicit social objectives as a basis for choosing development policies 
and programs.  In particular, any development intervention must be evaluated in terms of the benefits it provides to 
different socio-economic groups. 3 
 
However,  the  usefulness  of  the  above  described  decomposition  methods  in 
policymaking is severely limited by the fact that they explain changes in poverty on the 
basis of changes in summary statistics that are hard to target with policy instruments.  The 
difficulty stems from the fact that such statistics hide more than they reveal about the 
heterogeneity  of  impacts  underlying  aggregate  outcomes.    It  is  well  known  that 
heterogeneity  of  interests  and  of  individual  circumstances  plays  a  central  role  in  both 
policymaking and in the determination of the welfare impact of policy.  Ravallion (2001) 
argues that understanding this heterogeneity is crucial for the design and implementation 
of targeted interventions that might enhance the effectiveness of growth-oriented policies.  
He further adds that such an understanding must stem from a deeper micro empirical work 
on growth and distributional change. 
The purpose of this paper is to review the essence of existing methods that can be 
used to identify key factors that drive changes in the observed poverty outcomes.  The 
paper  is  akin  to  the  excellent  review  by  Ferreira  (2010)  of  the  evolution  of  the 
methodology for understanding the determinants of the relationship between economic 
growth, change in inequality and change in poverty.  While that review covers the macro-, 
meso-  and  micro-economic  approaches,  we  focus  on  a  variety  of  micro-decomposition 
methods  and  delve  deeper  into  the  identification  strategy  underlying  each  of  these 
methods.  The  point  of  departure  of  these  methods  is  the  same  as  that  of  the  macro 
methods noted above and presented in the appendix.  They too start from the fact that 
poverty measures, along with many other distributional statistics, can be viewed as real-
valued  functionals  of  the  relevant  distributions2 so that changes in poverty are due to 
changes in the underlying distribution of living standards.  Macro-decomposition methods 
proceed by characterizing changes in the underlying distribution  in terms of changes in 
aggregate statistics such as the mean, relative inequality, sub-group population shares and 
within-group poverty.  The micro-decomposition methods reviewed here go beyond these 
summary statistics and attempt to link distributional changes to fundamental elements that 
drive these changes. 
                                                           
2 Roughly speaking, a functional is a function of a function.  In this particular context, it is a rule that maps 
every distribution in its domain into a real number (Wilcox 2005). 4 
 
  The  outline  of  the  paper  is  as  follows.    Section  2  presents the  basic  framework 
underlying all decomposition methods considered in this paper.  The logic underpinning all 
these  methods  can  be  organized  around  the  following  terms:  (i)  domain,  (ii)  outcome 
model, (iii) scope, (iv) identification, and (v) estimation.  The type of distributional change 
a method seeks to decompose on the basis of a model that links the outcome of interest to 
its determining factors defines the domain of that method.  The specification of the outcome 
model  associated  with  a  decomposition  method  determines  the  potential  scope  of  the 
method, where scope represents the set of explanatory factors the method tries to uncover 
by  decomposition.    In  other  words,  the  scope  defines  the  terms  of  the  decomposition.  
Identification concerns the assumptions needed to recover, in a meaningful way, various 
terms of the decomposition.  The outcome model is used to construct counterfactuals on 
the  basis  of  ceteris  paribus  variations  of  the  determinants  in  order  to  identify  the 
contribution of each such factor to observed changes in the object of interest.   Finally, 
estimation involves the computation of identified parameters on the basis of sample data.  
These ideas, which constitute in fact the methodological bedrock of impact evaluation, will 
be illustrated within the basic Oaxaca-Blinder framework for decomposing changes in the 
mean of a distribution, and its generalization to any distributional statistic. 
Section 3 reviews methods used to identify and estimate the endowment and price 
effects along the entire outcome distribution.  Decomposing changes in whole distributions 
of outcomes is bound to reveal heterogeneity in the impact of the growth or development 
process  on  economic  welfare.    Furthermore,  a  poverty-focused  analysis  requires  an 
understanding of what goes on at and below the poverty line.  This section will therefore 
focus on the decomposition of differences in density functions and across quantiles based 
on purely statistical methods that rely on conditional outcome distributions.  It discusses 
the residual imputation method proposed by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) to split the 
price effect into a component due uniquely to observable characteristics and another due 
to unobservables.  One particular advantage of the statistical approach is that it provides 
the analyst with semi- and non-parametric methods for the identification of the aggregate 
endowment  and  price  effects  without  having  to  impose  a  functional  form  on  the 
relationship  between  the  outcome  and  its  determinants.    However,  the  statistical 5 
 
framework is unable to shed light on the mechanism underlying that relationship.  The 
decomposition results therefore do not have any causal interpretation. 
Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005) note that, in addition to the endowment and price 
effects, long-run changes in the distribution of the living standards are driven by changes in 
agents’ behavior with respect to labor supply, consumption patterns, or fertility choice.  A 
key limitation of the methods reviewed in section 3 is that they fail to account for the effect 
of behavioral changes in addition to the composition and structural effects.  Because these 
methods are based on statistical models of conditional distributions, it is conceivable that 
the behavioral effect is mixed up with the price effect identified by these methods.  Section 
4  therefore  considers  methods  that  have  been  proposed  to  account  for  behavioral 
responses to changes in the socioeconomic environment.  All these methods rely on the 
specification  and  estimation  of  a  microeconometric  model  based  on  some  theory  of 
individual (or household) behavior and social interaction.  These methods go a step further 
in trying to identify factors associated with structural elements that underpin observed 
changes in poverty outcomes.  Both the statistical and structural approaches seek to model 
conditional outcome distributions.  A key distinction between the two approaches is that 
the former relies entirely on statistics while the later combines economics and statistics. 
While the methods reviewed here have been applied mostly in labor economics to 
decompose wage distributions, this review will pay special attention to their adaptability to 
the decomposition of household consumption which is the basis of poverty measurement.  
Consideration  will  also  be  given  to  model  specifications  that  drop  the  assumption  of 
perfectly competitive markets to accommodate situations found most frequently in rural 
areas in developing countries.  Concluding remarks are made in section 5. 
2. The Basic Framework 
This  section  presents  a  theory  of  counterfactual  decomposition  of  variations  in 
individual and social outcomes and illustrates that conceptual framework in the context of 
the  classic  Oaxaca-Blinder  method  and  its  generalization  to  the  case  of  a  generic 
distributional statistic. 6 
 
2.1. A Theory of Counterfactual Decomposition 
All decomposition methods considered in this paper (including the macro methods 
presented  in  the  appendix)  are  governed  by  a  basic  theory  of  counterfactual 
decomposition.  Each method can be  characterized in terms of the  following elements: 
domain, outcome model, scope, identification and estimation procedure.  The domain is the 
type of distributional changes the method seeks to decompose (e.g. changes in poverty over 
time or across space).  The outcome model links the outcome of interest to its determining 
factors.  A poverty measure, for instance, is a social outcome that is a functional of the 
underlying  distribution  of  individual  outcomes.    As  noted  in  the  introduction  and 
demonstrated  in  the  appendix,  macro-decomposition  methods  use  this  fact  to  link 
variations in poverty to changes in the mean and relative inequality characterizing the 
underlying distribution. 
Outcome  models  used  by  micro-decomposition  methods  can  be  motivated  as 
follows.  Poverty measurement is based on a distribution of living standards.  The living 
standard of an individual is an outcome of an interaction between opportunities offered by 
society and the ability of the individual to identify and exploit such opportunities.  In other 
words, the living standard of an individual is a pay-off from her participation in the life of 
society.  One can thus think of life in society as a game defined by a set of rules governing 
various  interactions  of  the  parties  involved  (players).    These  rules  spell  out  what  the 
concerned parties are allowed to do and how these allowable actions determine outcomes.  
An environment within which a game is played consists of three basic elements: (1) a set of 
potential participants, (2) a set of possible outcomes and (3) a set of possible types of 
participants  (players).    Types  are  characterized  by  their  preferences,  capabilities, 
information and beliefs (Milgrom 2004).  The operation of a game can be represented by a 
function mapping environments to potential outcomes.  Thus an individual pay-off is a 
function  of  participation  and  type.    This  paradigm  motivates  our  thinking  of  the  living 
standard of an individual as a function of endowments, behavior and the circumstances that 
determine the returns to these endowments from any social transaction. 7 
 
The outcome model can take the form of a single equation or a set of equations (as 
we will see in section 4) and ultimately establishes a relationship between the domain and 
the scope of the decomposition method.  The scope is the set of explanatory factors the 
method tries to uncover by decomposition.  In fact, the specification of the outcome model 
determines the potential scope of the corresponding decomposition method.  For instance, 
the scope of the macro methods reviewed in the appendix is limited to some aggregate 
statistics based on the underlying outcome distribution.  Such statistics include: the mean, 
measures of relative inequality, population shares and within-group poverty.  The outcome 
model underlying micro-decomposition methods implies that the potential scope for these 
methods includes endowment and price effects, and behavioral responses.  However, the 
statistical methods discussed in section 3 are unable to account for behavior because they 
are  based  only  on  the  joint  distribution  of  the  outcome  and  individual  characteristics.  
Methods reviewed in section 4 can account for behavioral responses in addition to the 
endowment and price effects.  This ability stems from the fact that these methods combine 
economic  theory  of  behavior  and  social  interaction  with  statistics  to  explain  observed 
outcomes.  Behavior, endowments and prices thus represent some of the deep structural 
elements that drive the distributional changes underlying observed variations in poverty 
outcomes. 
Identification concerns the assumptions needed to recover the factors of interest at 
the population level.  While macro- and micro-decomposition methods differ in their scope 
(meaning the elements they try to identify) they share the same fundamental identification 
strategy based on the notion of ceteris paribus variation.  Attribution of outcomes to policy 
is  the  hallmark  of  policy  impact  evaluation.    Indeed,  variations  in  individual  outcomes 
associated with the implementation of a policy are not necessarily due to the policy in 
question.    These  variations  could  be  driven  by  changes  in  confounding  factors  in  the 
socioeconomic environment.  At the most fundamental level, all identification strategies 
seek to isolate an independent source of variation in policy and link it to the outcome of 
interest  to  ascertain  impact.    Macro  and  micro  methods  base  identification  of  the 
determinants of differences across distributions of living standards on  a comparison of 
counterfactual  distributions  with  the  observed  ones.    Counterfactual  distributions  are 8 
 
obtained by changing one determining factor at a time while holding all the other factors 
fixed (this is a straight application of the notion of ceteris paribus variation). 
Estimation  involves  the  computation  of  the  relevant  parameters  on  the  basis  of 
sample  data.    The  linchpin  of  the  whole  process  is  the  estimation  of  credible 
counterfactuals.  In  the  context  of  micro-decomposition  methods,  there  is  a  key 
counterfactual that must be carefully estimated, namely: the distribution of outcomes in the 
base state (t=0) assuming the distribution of individual characteristics prevailing in the end 
state (t=1).  Put another way, that counterfactual represents the distribution of outcomes 
that would prevail in the end state if the characteristics in that state had been treated 
according to the outcome structure prevailing in the initial state.  Depending on the chosen 
functional form for the outcome equation, there are both parametric and nonparametric 
ways of estimating this counterfactual.  We now consider the translation of these basic 
ideas into the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition framework. 
2.2. The Classic Oaxaca-Blinder Method 
Structure 
  As discussed in the next subsection, micro-decomposition methods encountered in 
the  literature  may  be  considered  a  generalization  of  the  classic  Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition method.  This approach assumes that the outcome variable y is a linear 
function of individual characteristics that is also separable in observable covariates x and 
unobservable factors ε.  In addition, it is assumed that the conditional mean of ε given the 
observables is equal to zero.  Focusing on variations over time, we let t=0 for the initial 
period and 1 for the end period.  Then the relationship between y and its determinants can 
be written as follows. 
                                           (1) 
Abstracting  from  the  time  subscript,  the  conditional  mean  outcome  can  be  written  as 
follows:               Therefore β is a measure of the effect of x on the conditional mean 
outcome.  Furthermore, the  law of iterated expectations implies  that  the  unconditional 
mean outcome is:                            This result implies that β also measures the 9 
 
effect of changing the mean value of x on the unconditional mean value of y.  This is the 
interpretation underlying the original Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition (Fortin, Lemieux and 
Firpo 2011). 
  Let   
                   represent  the  overall  difference  in  unconditional  mean 
outcome  between  the  two  periods.  This  is  the  domain  of  the  classic  Oaxaca-Blinder 
method.  This domain can also be expressed as:   
                      .  The average 
outcome for period 1 valued on the basis of the parameters for period 0 is equal to        .  
This is a counterfactual outcome for period 1.  We can subtract it from and add it back to 
the above overall mean difference to get the following expression3. 
     
                                                 (2) 
Looking at the regression coefficients β as characterizing the returns to (or reward for) 
observables  characteristics,  this  aggregate  decomposition  reveals  that,  under  the 
maintained assumptions (i.e. identifying assumptions), the overall mean difference can be 
expressed as:   
     
      
 , where   
  is the endowment effect and   
  is the price effect4. 
The assumption of additive linearity implies that one can also perform a  detailed 
decomposition  whereby  the  endowment  and  price  effects  are  each  divided  into  the 
respective  contribution  of  each  covariate.  To  see  this  formally,  let xk and βk stand 
respectively for the k
th element of x and β.  Then the endowment and price effects can be written 
in terms of sums over the explanatory variables.  For the endowment effect, we have 
    
                                   
 
               (3) 
Similarly for the structural effect, we have the following expression 
    
                             
                  (4) 
                                                           
3 An alternative expression is based on this counterfactual:        .  The corresponding decomposition is: 
  
                                     . 
4 In the literature, the endowment effect is also known as the composition effect while the price effect is also 
referred to as the structural effect.  See Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011) for the use of this terminology. 10 
 
Expressions (3) and (4) provide a simple way of dividing the endowment and the price effects 
into the contribution of a single covariate or a group of covariates as needed. 
The above  components  are easily  computed by replacing the expected values by  the 
corresponding sample means and the coefficients associated with the covariates by their OLS 
estimates.  An estimate of the endowment effect is: 
     
 
                                      
                      (5) 
Similarly, for the price effect, we have the following expression. 
     
 
                                              
 
                            (6) 
Interpretation 
  As Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011) point out, there is a powerful analogy between 
the  Oaxaca-Blinder  decomposition  method  and  treatment  effect  analysis5.    Treatment 
impact  analysis  seeks  to  identify  and  estimate  the  average  effect  of  treatment  (i.e. 
intervention) on the treated (i.e. those exposed to  an intervention) on the basis of the 
difference in average outcomes between the treated and a comparison group .    In that 
context, t indicates treatment status.  It is equal to 1 for the treated and 0 for the untreated 
(the comparison or control group).  The expression,   
                  , can therefore be 
interpreted  as  the  difference  in  average  outcomes  between  the  treated  and  untreated.  
Under the assumptions6 underlying the basic Oaxaca-Blinder method, it is clear that this 
difference is due to differences in observable character istics (i.e. the composition effect) 
and in treatment status.  The part due to the difference in treatment status is known as the 
                                                           
5 Indeed, these authors provide a systematic interpretation of decomposition methods within the  logic of 
program impact evaluation. 
6 According to Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo   (2011), these assumptions include the following: (1)Mutually 
exclusive groups;(2) The outcome structure is an additively separable function of characteristics; (3) Zero 
conditional mean for unobservables given observed characteristics;(4)Common support fo r the distributions 
of characteristics across groups (to rule out cases where arguments of the outcome function may differ across 
groups; (5) Simple counterfactual treatment, meaning that the outcome structure of one group is assumed to 
be a counterfactual for the other group.  This last assumption rules out general equilibrium effects so that 
observed outcomes for one group or time period can be reasonably used to construct counterfactuals for the 
other group or time period.  The Oaxaca-Blinder method therefore follows a partial equilibrium approach. 11 
 
average treatment effect on the treated (ATET) and is in fact equal to the structural or price 
effect. 
Note  that  the  conventional  approach  to  impact  evaluation  also  relies  on  ceteris 
paribus variation of treatment in order to identify its average effect on the treated.  Within 
that logic, the composition effect is equivalent to selection bias that must be driven to zero 
by  the  use  of  randomization,  propensity  score  matching  or  similar  methods.  
Randomization ensures that the distribution of observed and unobserved characteristics is 
the  same  for  both  the  treated  and  the  control  group.    By  balancing  observed  and 
unobserved characteristics between the groups prior to the administration of treatment, 
randomization guarantees that the average difference in outcome between the two groups 
is due to treatment alone, hence the causal interpretation given to this parameter under 
those circumstances.  In other words, the first term on the right hand side of equation (2), 
that is the endowment effect or selection bias, is equal to zero under random assignment to 
treatment and full compliance7.  It is clear that randomization is designed to implement a 
ceteris paribus variation in treatment. 
In the context of observational studies where the investigator does not have control 
over the assignment of subjects to treatment , the  determination  of  the  causal  effect  of 
treatment hinges critically on the understanding of the underlying treatment assignment or 
selection mechanism which must explain how people end up in alternative treatment states.  
The assumption of selection on observables (also known as ignorability) is often invoked to 
implement  ceteris  paribus  identification  of  the  average  treatment  effect  through 
conditioning by stratification.  Basically, conditioning by stratification entails comparing 
only those subjects with the same value of covariates x across the two groups (treated and 
untreated).  This type of selection of individuals from the two groups is known as matching.  
                                                           
7 Heckman and Smith (1995) explain that the mean outcome of the control group provides an acceptable 
estimate of the counterfactual mean if randomization does not alter the pool of participants or their behavior, 
and if no close substitutes for the experimental program are readily available.  These authors further note 
that  randomization  does  not  eliminate  selection  bias,  but  rather  balances  it  between  the  two  samples 
(participants and nonparticipants) so that it cancels out when computing mean impact.  There would be 
randomization bias if those who participate in an experiment differ from those who would have participated 
in the absence of randomization.  Furthermore, substitution bias would occur if members of the control group 
can easily obtain elsewhere close substitutes for the treatment. 12 
 
There is a potential dimension problem associated with matching when there are many 
observable characteristics taking many values.  Insisting on conditioning based on exact 
values  can  lead  to  too  few  observations  in  each  subgroup  characterized  by  these 
observables.  This dimensionality problem can be resolved by matching on the propensity 
score,  that  is,  the  conditional  probability  of  receiving  treatment  given  observable 
characteristics (Rosenbaum and Rubin 1983). 
  The  analogy  between  treatment  effect  analysis  and  the  Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition  method  has  been  extremely  useful  for  the  development  of  flexible 
estimation  methods  for  endowment  and  structural  effects.    Fortin,  Lemieux  and  Firpo 
(2011) explain that selection on observables implies that the conditional distribution of 
unobservable factors is the same in both groups (treated and comparison).  They further 
note that, while this assumption is weaker than the zero conditional mean assumption8 
used in the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition, it is enough to secure identification 
and consistent estimation of the ATET and hence the structural effect ,   
 , (in the Oaxaca-
Blinder  framework).  These  authors  give  the  example  of  education  and  unobservable 
ability.    They  explain  that  if  education  and  ability  are  correlated,  this  creates  an 
endogeneity problem that prevents a linear regression of earnings on education to produce 
consistent estimates of the structural parameters measuring the return to education.  Yet 
the aggregate decomposition remains valid as long as the correlation between ability and 
education is the same in both groups. 
A  major  implication  of  the  difference  in  identification  assumptions  between  the 
traditional  Oaxaca-Blinder  approach  and  treatment  effect  analysis  is  that  consistent 
estimators of the ATET such as inverse probability weighing (IPW) and matching can be 
used to estimate the structural effect (  
 ) even if the underlying relationship between the 
outcome and covariates is not linear.  Given such an estimate, the composition effect can be 
calculated  as  a  residual  from  the  overall  mean  difference  as  follows:  
     
      
 .    In 
                                                           
8 Recall that, the identification of the two components of the aggregate Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition relies 
on the zero conditional mean assumption for the unobservable factors stated as:           .  This condition 
is  what  allows  the  analyst  to  claim  that  on  average,  variation  in  x  is  unrelated  to  variation  in  the 
unobservables, a manifestation of ceteris paribus variation. 13 
 
particular, decomposition methods based on this weighting procedure are known to be 
efficient. 
Limitations 
While treatment effect analysis can help with the identification and estimation of the 
structural effect, it is important to note that there are two basic reasons why this effect 
does not necessarily inherit the causal interpretation generally enjoyed by the ATET.  The 
first reason stems from the fact that in many cases, group membership is not the result of a 
choice or an exogenous assignment but a consequence of an intrinsic characteristic such as 
gender or race.  The other important reason is that many of the observable covariates are 
not equivalent to the so-called pre-treatment variables that are not supposed to be affected 
by the treatment (Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo 2011). 
Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011) point out two other important limitations of the 
standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition method.  The contribution of each covariate to the 
structural effect is highly sensitive to the choice of the omitted group when the explanatory 
variables include a categorical variable.  Jann (2008) discusses possible solutions to this 
problem.    The  second  limitation  stems  from  the  fact  that  the  decomposition  provides 
consistent estimates only under the assumption that the conditional expectation is linear.  
Under  the  linearity  assumption,  the  counterfactual  average  when  t=1  is  simply  equal 
to:                     This  is  estimated  by  the  cross-product  of  sample  means  of 
characteristics  for t=1 with the  relevant  OLS coefficients  from t=0.  The corresponding 
estimate is:         .  The counterfactual mean outcome will not be equal to this term when 
linearity does not hold.  One possible solution is to reweight the sample for t=0 using the 
inverse probability method9 and to compute the counterfactual mean outcome on the basis 
of statistics from the reweighted counterfactual sample.  Let    
  be the vector of the means 
of adjusted covariates in t=0, and    
 
  the corresponding least squares coefficients.  Then the 
correct counterfactual mean outcome when the linearity assumption does not hold is:    
    
 
 .  
This is the term to add to and subtract from the empirical version of the overall difference 
                                                           
9 We will come back to this point in the next subsection. 14 
 
in mean outcome to get the appropriate estimates of the endowment and structural effects 
when the linearity assumption fails. 
2.3. A Generalization of the Oaxaca-Blinder Decomposition 
As  noted  above,  the  standard  Oaxaca-Blinder  decomposition  method  focuses  on 
differences  in  mean  outcomes  between  two  groups  and  relies  on  some  stringent 
assumptions to identify the endowment and structural effects.  We now consider how to 
extend  the  logic  underlying  this  method  to  the  decomposition  of  differences  in 
distributional statistics other than the mean such as poverty or inequality measures.  We 
consider both aggregate and detailed decompositions. 
Aggregate Decomposition 
Just  as  in  the  case  of  the  basic  Oaxaca-Blinder  method,  we  are  interested  in 
decomposing a change in some distributional statistic, say θ, from the base period t=0 to 
the end period t=1.  As noted in the introduction, all distributional statistics such as the 
mean,  quantiles,  the  variance,  poverty  and  inequality  measures,  can  be  viewed  as 
functionals of the underlying outcome distribution.  Thus, the principle of decomposition 
presented  here  applies  to  all  of  them.    Let         stand  for  the  outcome  distribution 
observed in the initial period and         that observed in the final period.  The overall 
difference in the distribution of outcomes between states 0 and 1 can be written in terms of 
θ(F) as follows (Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo 2011). 
    
                                         (7) 
Equation (7) characterizes the domain of the decomposition methods in this paper.  
As  far  as  the  scope  is  concerned,  most  micro  methods  seek  to  decompose  this  overall 
difference on the basis of the relationship between the outcome variable and individual or 
household characteristics.  The following equation represents a general expression of that 
relationship. 
                         .                (8) 15 
 
Equation  (8)  suggests  that  conditional  on  the  observable  characteristics,  x,  the 
outcome  distribution  depends  only  on  the  function  φt(∙)  and  the  distribution  of  the 
unobservable characteristics ε.  Thus there are four potential terms in the scope of micro-
decomposition methods based on this framework.  Differences in outcome distributions 
between  the  two  periods  may  be  due  to:  (i)  differences  in  the  returns  to  observable 
characteristics given the functions defining the outcome structure, (ii) differences in the 
returns  to  unobservable  characteristics  also  defined  by  the  structural  functions  (iii) 
differences  the  distribution  of  observable  characteristics,  and  (iii)  differences  in  the 
distribution of unobservable characteristics. 
  Given the potential scope implied by the outcome model (8), the next step is to 
impose enough restrictions in order to identify the factors of interest.  In general these 
restrictions  are  imposed  on  the  form  of  the  outcome  functions,  φt(∙),  and  on  the  joint 
distribution of the observable and unobservable characteristics, x and ε.  Let’s maintain the 
assumptions of mutually exclusive groups, simple counterfactual treatment and common 
support that also underlie the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition.  Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo 
(2011)  explain  that,  under  the  general  outcome  model  presented  in  equation  (8),  it  is 
impossible  to  distinguish  the  contribution  of  the  returns  to  observables  from  that  of 
unobservables.  These two terms can therefore be lumped in a single term, the structural 
effect noted   
 .  Let   
  stand for the endowment effect and   
  for the effect associated with 
differences in the distribution of unobservables.  The issue now is to identify these three 
effects so that they account for the overall difference described by equation (7). 
Let        be  the  outcomes  that  would  have  prevailed  in  period  1  if  individual 
characteristics in that period had been rewarded according to φ0(∙).  Let         stand for 
the corresponding distribution and            the corresponding value of the statistic of 
interest.  Assuming ignorability in addition to the previously maintained assumptions, the 
endowment  effect  is  identified  by:   
                             .    The  validity  of  this 
identification  rests  on  that  of  the  assumption  of  ignorability  which  implies  that  the 
conditional distribution of unobservable factors is the same in both states of the world.  
Hence   
    .  Under the same set of assumptions, the structural effect is due solely to 16 
 
differences  in  the  functions  defining  the  outcomes10.  This  effect is identified by the 
following expression:   
                            . 
Given the outcome model represented by equation (8), assuming mutually exclusive 
groups,  common  support,  simple  counterfactual  treatment  and  ignorability,  we  can 
decompose the distributional difference in equation (7) by adding to and subtracting from 
it the counterfactual outcome           .  This leads to the following expression. 
    
                                                              (9) 
where the first term on the right hand side is the endowment effect and the second is the 
structural effect (Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo 2011).  In the context of poverty analysis, if P 
stands for the poverty measure of interest, then equation (9) implies that observed changes 
in poverty can be decomposed as follows. 
    
                                                              (10) 
DiNardo,  Fortin  and  Lemieux  (1996)  show  that  the  counterfactual  distribution, 
       , can be estimated by properly reweighing the distribution of covariates in period 0.  
One can express the resulting counterfactual distribution as follows11. 
                                                   (11) 
where the reweighing factor is equal to:       
       
         
        
            
   
  .  These weights are 
proportional to the conditional odds of being observed in state 1.  The proportionality 
factor depends on π which is the proportion of cases observed in state 1.  One can easily 
                                                           
10 To see this, note that                    and                   . 
11 To further appreciate the importance of the identifying assumptions, note that the process of reweighing 
adjusts the distribution of the covariates x in period t=0 so that it becomes similar to that in period t=1.  For 
this adjustment to help us identify t he terms of the decomposition it must be a  ceteris paribus adjustment.  
Since             , the ceteris paribus  condition  would  be violated if changing the distribution of x also 
changed either the function φ0(∙) or the conditional distribution of ε given x.  This would confound the impact 
of the adjustment and the decomposition would be meaningless.  Changes in the structural function are ruled 
out  by  the  simple  treatment  assumption  (no  general  equilibrium  effects)  while  those  in  the  conditional 
distribution  of ε  are  ruled  out  by  the  ignorability  assumption.    Under  this  circumstances,  we  expect  the 
conditional distribution of y0 given x to be invariant with respect to adjustments in the distribution of the 
observable factors x.  See Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011) for a more formal presentation of this argument. 17 
 
compute the reweighing factor on the basis of a probability model such as logit or probit.  
Furthermore, if one is interested only in the aggregate decomposition of the variation in a 
distributional statistic, then all that is needed are an estimate of the relevant counterfactual 
distribution and the corresponding value of the statistic in question. 
  The  decomposition  presented  in  equation  (9)  is  based  on  a  nonparametric 
identification  and can be  estimated by the  Inverse  Probability Weighing (IPW) method 
implied by equation (11).  Nonparametric methods allow analysts to decompose changes in 
distributional statistics into endowment and structural effects without having to assume a 
functional form for the outcome model.  The downside is that one cannot separate the 
respective contributions of the  observable  and unobservable  factors into  the  structural 
effect, nor can one account for changes in agents’ behavior.  In the next section we consider 
a way of separating the contribution of unobservables from that of observables, and in 
section 4 we review methods that have been proposed to account for behavioral responses. 
Detailed Decomposition 
Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011) explain that a decomposition approach provides a 
detailed  decomposition  when  it  allows  one  to  apportion  the  composition  effect  or  the 
structural  effect  into  components  attributable  to  each  explanatory  variable.    The 
contribution of each explanatory variable to the composition effect is analogous to what 
Rothe  (2010)  calls  a  “partial composition effect”12.    As  discussed  earlier,  this  is  easily 
accomplished in the context of the classic Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition because of the 
two underlying assumptions of linearity and zero conditional mean for the unobservable 
factors.  Recentered influence function (RIF) regression that we review next also offers a 
possibility  to  perform  detailed  decomposition  in  a  way  that  mimics  the  basic  Oaxaca-
Blinder approach. 
RIF regression offers a simple way of establishing a direct link between a distributional 
statistic and individual (or household) characteristics.  This link offers an opportunity to perform 
                                                           
12 This is the effect of a counterfactual change in the marginal distribution of a single covariate on the unconditional 
distribution of an outcome variable, ceteris paribus.  Rothe (2010) interprets the ceteris paribus condition in terms 
of rank invariance.  In other words, the counterfactual change in the marginal distribution of the relevant covariate is 
constructed in such a way that the joint distribution of ranks is unaffected. 18 
 
both aggregate and detailed decompositions for any such statistic for which one can compute an 
influence  function  (Fortin,  Lemieux  and  Firpo  2011).    In  the  literature,  the  derivative  of  a 
functional θ(F) is called the influence function of θ at F.  The function measures the relative 
effect of a small perturbation in F on θ(F).  In that sense, it is a measure of robustness
13.  Firpo, 
Fortin and Lemieux (2009) define the recentered or rescaled influence function (RIF) as the 
leading terms of a von Mises (1947) linear approximation of the associated functional
14.  It is 
equal to the functional plus the corresponding influence function. 
It is known that the expected value of the influence  function is equal to zero.  Th is 
implies that the expected value of the RIF is equal to the corresponding distributio nal statistic.  
In other words,                      .  By the law of iterated expectations the distributional 
statistic  of  interest  can  be  written  as  the  conditional  expectation  of  the  rescaled  influence 
function (given the observable covariates, x).  This is the RIF regression that, for       , can be 
expressed as:              .  The distributional statistic        can therefore be expressed in 
terms of this conditional expectation as follows (Firpo, Fortin, Lemieux 2009). 
                                             (12) 
This expression suggests that to assess the impact of covariates on       , one needs to 
integrate  over  the  conditional  expectation              .    This  can  be  easily  done  using 
regression methods.  In particular, one can model this conditional expectation as a linear function 
of observable covariates as :                   , and apply OLS to the following equation. 
                                     (13) 
Fortin,  Lemieux  and  Firpo  (2011)  explain  that  the  expected  value  of  the  linear 
approximation  of  the  RIF  regression  is  equal  to  the  expected  value  of  the  true  conditional 
expectation because the expected value of the approximation error is zero.  This fact makes the 
extension of the standard Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition to RIF regressions both simple and 
meaningful. 
                                                           
13 Wilcox (2005)  explains  that  continuity  alone  confers  only  qualitative  robustness  to the  statistic  under 
consideration.    A  continuous  function  is  relatively  unaffected  by  small  shifts  in  its  argument.    Similarly, 
differentiability is related to infinitesimal robustness in the sense that, if a function is differentiable and its 
derivative is bounded, then small variations in the argument will not result in large changes in the function.  
Thus a search for robust statistics can focus on functionals with bounded derivatives. 
14 This is analogous to the approximation of a differentiable function at a point by a Taylor’s polynomial. 19 
 
Applying  the  standard  Oaxaca-Blinder  approach  to  equation  (13)  we  find  that  the 
endowment effect can be written as follows. 
    
                                             (14) 
The corresponding structural effect is 
    
                                         (15) 
This  decomposition  may  involve  a  bias  since  the  linear  specification  is  only  a  local 
approximation that may not hold in the case of large changes in covariates
15.  The solution to this 
problem, consistent with our discussion in  subsection 2.2, is to combine reweighing with RIF 
regression (see Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo 2011) for details. 
 
3. Endowment and Price Effects along the Entire Outcome Distribution 
  The presentation of the basic framework in section 2 focuses on the decomposition 
of  aggregate  statistics.    As  noted  in  the  introduction,  these  statistics  provide  little 
information  about  the  heterogeneity  of  impacts  underlying  aggregate  outcomes.    This 
section therefore applies the same framework to the identification and estimation of the 
aggregate endowment and price effects along the whole distribution of outcomes.  All the 
methods reviewed in this section are purely statistical in the sense that they all rely on 
models of the conditional distribution of outcomes given the covariates.  We consider in 
turn  the  decomposition  of  differences  in  density  functions  and  across  quantiles.    The 
decomposition across quantiles also allows the analyst to express changes in poverty in 
terms of endowment and price effects.  The decomposition of changes in density functions 
relies  on  nonparametric  methods.    In  the  case  of  quantiles,  we  focus  on  parametric 
methods.    Along  the  way,  we  note  circumstances  under  which  the  contribution  of 
unobservables in the structural effect can be distinguished from that of observables.   
3.1 Differences in Density Functions 
For decomposition purposes, one needs a model that links the outcome of interest 
to household characteristics.  To focus on differences in density functions, we maintain that 
the outcome variable y has a joint distribution with characteristics, x.  This distribution is 
                                                           
15 In particular,   and    may differ just because their estimation is based on different distributions of the 
covariates x, even if the outcome structure remains unchanged (Firpo, Fortin and Lemieux 2009). 20 
 
characterized by the following joint density function:               .  The generalization of 
the Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition considered here requires the marginal distribution of y 
noted  as:       .    This  marginal  density  function  can  be  obtained  by  integrating  the 
covariates x out of the joint density.  Furthermore, the factorization principle allows one to 
write the joint density as a product of the distribution of y conditional on x,        , and the 
joint  distribution  of  characteristics,      .    These  are  the  two  factors  underpinning  the 
decomposition.  Any change in the marginal outcome distribution induced by a variation in 
the  distribution  of  observed  characteristics  (ceteris paribus)  represents  the  endowment 
effect, while any change in the distribution associated with a (ceteris paribus) variation in 
the conditional distribution is interpreted as the price-behavioral effect (Bourguignon and 
Ferreira 2005). 
To see clearly what is involved16, we express the joint density function as a product 
of the two underlying  functions:                               .    On  the  basis  of  this 
factorization, we can write the marginal density of y in a way that facilitates the expression 
and interpretation of the decomposition results, that is:              
     .  Thus the observed 
change in the outcome distribution between the two periods can be stated as follows. 
                           
            
                 (16) 
We  can  add  to  and  subtract  from  the  difference  defined  in  (16)  the  following 
counterfactual17:     
     .  This is the marginal  density function that would obtain if the 
conditional distribution were that of period 0, and the joint distribution of characteristics 
                                                           
16 This account draws on Essama-Nssah and Bassolé (2010) 
17 To clarify our notation, we consider the simplest case where x represents a single characteristic.  No loss of 
generality is involved.  The marginal distribution of y is equal to                     
  
  , where mx stands for the 
maximum value of x.  Equivalently,              
                        
  
  .  The counterfactual used in equation 
(17)  is  therefore  defined  as  follows:     
                     
  
   .    This  expression  can  be  derived  from  the 
marginal outcome distribution in the initial period,                          
  
  , by replacing       with      .  
As explained in footnote 11, for this operation to lead to a meaningful counterfactual, two invariance conditions 
must be  met.  The conditional distributions         must be invariant  with respect to changes in the  marginal 
distribution  of  observables,      .    This  would  be  the  case  if  there  are  no  general  equilibrium  effects.    The 
distribution  of  unobservables  must  be  at  least  conditionally  independent  of  that  of  observables.    Ignorability 
guarantees this. 21 
 
that  prevailing  in  period  1.    This  transformation  leads  us  to  the  following  generalized 
decomposition of changes in the marginal density of y. 
          
            
              
            
                (17) 
The  configuration  of  the  indices  (subscripts  and  superscripts)  for  the  marginal 
distributions involved in (17) suggests an interpretation of the various components of the 
decomposition.  The first component on the right hand side is the endowment effect (based 
on changes in the joint distribution of observed characteristics).  The second component 
measures the price-behavioral effect (linked to the change in the conditional distribution of 
y which, in fact, also includes the effect of unobservables). 
  In their study of the role of institutional factors in accounting for changes in the 
distribution of wages in the U.S., DiNardo, Fortin and Lemieux (1996) demonstrate how to 
implement empirically the above decomposition using kernel density methods to estimate 
the  relevant  density functions.  The histogram  is  the  oldest and  most  common  density 
estimator (Silverman 1986), and kernel methods may be viewed as ways of smoothing a 
histogram. The basic idea is to estimate the density f(y) by the proportion of the sample that 
is near y.  One way of proceeding is to choose some interval or “band” and to count the 
points in the band around each y and normalize the count by the sample size multiplied by 
the bandwidth.  The whole procedure can be viewed as sliding the band (or window) along 
the range of y, calculating the fraction of the sample per unit within the band, and plotting 
the result as an estimate of the density at the mid-point of the band (Deaton 1997)18. 
  The kernel estimate of the density function        can be written as follows. 
            
 
   
    
     
   
  
            .             (18) 
                                                           
18 Deaton (1997) further explains that the size of the bandwidth is inversely related to the sample size.  The 
larger the sample size, the smaller the bandwidth.  To obtain a consistent estimate of the density at each 
point, the bandwidth must become smaller at a rate that is slower than the rate at which the sample size is 
increasing.  However, with only a few points, we need large bands to be able to get any points in each.  By 
widening the bands, we run the risk of biasing the estimate by bringing into the count data that belong to 
other parts of the distribution.  Hence, the increase in the sample size does two things.  It allows the analyst to 
reduce the bandwidth and hence the bias in estimation (due to increased mass at the point of interest), it also 
ensures that the variance will shrink as the number of points within each band increases. 22 
 
where h is the bandwidth representing the smoothing parameter, nt is the sample size for 
period t, y is the focal point where the density is estimated, and K(∙) is the kernel function.  
A kernel function is essentially a weighting function chosen in such a way that more weight 
is given to points near y and less to those far away.  In particular, it will assign a weight of 
zero to points just outside and just inside the band.  As a weighting function, the kernel 
function should satisfy four basic properties: (i) positive, (ii) integrate to unity over the 
band, (iii) symmetric around zero so that points below y get the same weight as those an 
equal  distance  above, (iv)  decreasing  in  the  absolute  value  of  its  argument.  The  most 
common kernel functions used in empirical work are the Gaussian and the Epanechnikov 
kernel19. 
  The  counterfactual  density  function  that  is  the  linchpin  of  the  decomposition 
presented  in  equation  (17)  can  be  written  in  a  manner  analogous  to  the  distribution 
functions underlying the decomposition presented in equation in (9)20.  In other words, 
    
                .    This  density  can  be  estimated  by  reweighing  the  kernel  estimate  for 
period  0  using  the  same  weighing  function  as  the  one  underlying  the  counterfactual 
distribution defined in equation (11).  The resulting expression is: 
                 
 
   
         
     
   
  
                (19) 
  Machado and Mata (2005) propose a semi-parametric approach to estimating the 
density functions needed in the above decomposition.  Their approach is based on a two-
step procedure that allows them to derive marginal density functions from the conditional 
quantile  process  that  fully  characterizes  the  conditional  distribution  of  y  given  the 
covariates x.  Specifically, these authors model the conditional distribution of y given x by a 
linear conditional quantile function as follows. 
                                                    (20) 
                                                           
19 Deaton (1997) argues that the choice of the bandwidth or the smoothing parameter is more important than 
that of the kernel function.  Essentially, estimating densities by kernel methods is an exercise in smoothing 
the  sample  observations  into  an  estimated  density.    The  bandwidth  controls  the  amount  of  smoothing 
achieved.  Over-smoothed estimates are biased, while under-smoothed ones are too variable. 
20 The equivalent expression for the decomposition is:                                                   . 23 
 
  The second step in the approach entails estimating the marginal density function of 
y that is consistent with the conditional quantile process defined by (20).  This is achieved 
by running the following algorithm: (i) Draw a random sample of size m from a uniform 
distribution on [0, 1] to get τj for j=1, 2,  , m; (ii) For each τj, use available data to estimate 
the quantile regression model and get m estimates of coefficients                     ; (iii) 
Given that xt is a (nt x k) matrix of data on covariates, draw a random sample of size m from 
the rows of xt and denote each such sample by    
 ; (iv) The corresponding values of the 
outcome variable are given by:    
       
                     .  The validity of this procedure 
stems  from  the  probability integral transformation theorem  which  states  that,  if  u  is  a 
random variable uniformly distributed over [0, 1], then            is distributed like F.  
Here  τj  is  assumed  to  be  a  realization  of       .    Given  model  (20),  the  corresponding 
conditional quantile regression model can be written as (Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo 2011): 
                     
                                       (21) 
  A modified version of the above algorithm leads to the critical counterfactual upon 
which the decomposition is based.  Recall that the counterfactual of interest is the density 
function of the outcome in period 1 assuming that the characteristics of that period had 
been rewarded according to the system prevailing in period 0.  This counterfactual can be 
estimated by applying the above algorithm to the data for period 0, except that at stage (iii) 
covariates  must  be  drawn  from  data  for  period  1.  On  the  basis  of  equation  (21),  the 
conditional regression model associated with this counterfactual is the following. 
                     
                                 (22) 
As  noted  by  Fortin,  Lemieux  and  Firpo  (2011),  this  approach  is  computationally 
demanding.  They suggest a simplification based on the estimation of a large number of 
quantile  regressions  (say  99)  instead  of  using  the  random  process.  The  conditional 
quantile function can then be inverted to obtain the conditional cumulative distribution 
which  must  be  averaged  over  the  empirical  distribution  of  the  covariate  to  yield 
unconditional distribution function.  In fact, Machado and Mata (2005) acknowledge that 
this is a viable alternative to their method. 24 
 
3.2 Differences across Quantiles 
One  can  also  work  with  quantiles  instead  of  density  functions  (or  equivalently, 
distribution functions) to decompose changes along the entire outcome distribution.  Since 
the  decomposition  must  be  based  on  marginal  distributions,  one  needs  to  work  with 
marginal quantiles, not conditional ones.  There is a variety of ways to go about it.  Recall 
that the general decomposition presented in section 2 about a distributional statistic θ(Fy) 
applies to any statistic including quantiles.  In that case, the counterfactual distribution is 
derived  from  equation  (11).    Alternatively,  marginal  quantiles  can  be  derived  from 
equations (20) and (21) based on the Machado and Mata (2005) procedure or by numerical 
integration as proposed by (Melly 2005). 
To link conditional quantiles to marginal quantiles, Angrist and Pischke (2009) start 
from the observation that the proportion of the population below qτ conditional on x is 
equal to the proportion of conditional quantiles that are below qτ.  Let I(∙) be the indicator 
function that takes a value of 1 if its argument is true and 0 otherwise.  Again, let        
stand for the conditional cumulative distribution function (CDF) of y given x.  Thus the 
proportion  of  the  population  for  which  the  outcome  y  is  less  than  qτ  is  equal  to: 
                     
               
 
  , where the term on the right hand side is equal to the 
proportion of conditional quantiles that are below qτ.  On the basis of equation (20), we can 
rewrite this proportion as :                               
 
  .  The marginal distribution of y, 
     from which one derives marginal quantiles, is obtained by integrating the conditional 
distribution over the whole range of the distribution of the covariates (Melly 2005).  The 
resulting  expression  is:                             
 
      .    The  sample  analog  of  this 
expression based on an estimation of quantile regressions at every percentile for a sample 
of size n is given by the following expression (Angrist and Pischke 2009). 
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The marginal quantile corresponding to the above estimator of the marginal distribution of 
the response variable is obtained by inverting (23).  We note these marginal quantiles 
as:                                  . 
  The  generalized  Oaxaca-Blinder  decomposition  described  by  equation  (9)  can 
equivalently be stated in terms of these marginal quantiles.  The observed change in the 
marginal  distribution  of  the  response  variable  is  now  written  as:                       
              .  To distinguish the endowment effect from the price effect, we subtract from 
and  add  to  this  expression  the  following  counterfactual  outcome:               .    This 
counterfactual  involves  the  characteristics  of  period  1  evaluated  with  the  prices 
(coefficients) of period 0.  The corresponding decomposition analogous to expression (9) is 
the following. 
                                                                               (24) 
Consistent with equation (9), the first term on the right hand side of (24) is the endowment 
effect  at  the  τth  quantile  while  the  second  term  measures  the  price  effect  at  the  same 
location. 
As noted in section 2, one can use RIF regression to perform detailed decomposition 
of  differences  across  quantiles.    Firpo,  Fortin  and  Lemieux  (2009) show that the rescaled 
influence function of the τ
th quantile of the distribution of y is the following
21: 
                                    
           
                  (25) 
Where I(∙) is an indicator function for whether the outcome variable y is less than or equal to the  
τ
th quantile and fy(qτ) is the density function of y evaluated at the τ
th quantile.  Essama-Nssah et 
                                                           
21 Essama-Nssah and Lambert (2011) show how to derive the influence function of a functional from the 
associated  directional  derivative.    They  present  a  collection  of  influence  functions  for  social  evaluation 
functions commonly used in assessing the distributional and poverty impact of public policy.  Their catalog 
includes, among others, influence functions and recentered influence functions for the mean, the τth quantile, 
the  Gini  coefficient,  the  Atkinson  index  of  inequality,  the  class  of additively  separable  poverty  measures 
defined  in  equation  (27)  below,  the  growth  incidence  curve  ordinate,  the  Lorenz  curve  and  generalized 
Lorenz curve ordinates, the  TIP curve  ordinate and some measures of pro-poorness associated  with the 
Foster, Greer and Thorbecke (1984) family of poverty measures. 26 
 
al. (2010) apply this methodology to account for heterogeneity in the incidence of economic 
growth in Cameroon. 
At  this  stage  we  pause,  to  consider  the  implications  of  this  decomposition  for 
poverty comparison over time.  One can use equation (24) repeatedly to decompose, the 
first 99 quantiles (percentiles) of the outcome distribution of interest.  This means that we 
can decompose the growth incidence curve22 (GIC) in a component due to the endowment 
effect and another due to the price effect.   Formally, we express this decomposition as 
follows. 
                                    (26) 
where the first component on the right hand side of (26) is the endowment effect for the 
GIC and the second term is the corresponding structural effect. 
For the class of additively separable poverty measures, a change in poverty over 
time can be written as a weighted sum of points on the growth incidence curve (Essama-
Nssah and Lambert 2009, Ferreira 2010).  Therefore, change in poverty over time inherits 
the decomposability of the growth incidence curve.  To see what is involved here, note that 
the class of additively separable poverty measures is defined by the following expression: 
                      
 
                  (27) 
where F stands for the distribution of a continuous outcome variable y and z is the poverty 
line.  This expression makes it clear that the poverty measure P(∙) can be viewed as a 
functional of F.  In other words, a poverty measure reveals the level of aggregate poverty 
associated  with  a  distribution  and  a  poverty  line.    The  term        is  a  convex  and 
decreasing  function  measuring  deprivation  for  an  individual  with  a  level  of  economic 
welfare equal to y.  This function is equal to zero when the welfare indicator is greater or 
equal to the poverty line.  For members of the additively separable class defined by (27), a 
change in poverty associated with the growth pattern depicted by the incidence curve      
is given by the following expression: 
                                                           
22 Ravallion and Chen (2003) define  the  growth incidence  curve as the  growth rate of  an indicator of  welfare 
(income or consumption) y at the p
th percentile point of its distribution.  The outcome at that point can be noted a 
y(p). 27 
 
                          
 
0                 (28) 
where    is the first-order derivative of the indicator of individual deprivation.   On the 
basis  of  equation  (26),  the  variation  in  poverty  defined  by  equation  (28)  can  be 
equivalently expressed as follows. 




0           (29) 
The first term on the right hand side of (29) represents the endowment effect based on the 
endowment effect for the GIC.  Similarly, the second term is associated with the price or 
structural effect for the GIC.  In terms of equation (24), note that                        .    
Again,  in  this  case,  the  corresponding  detailed  decomposition  of  the  GIC  carries  over  to 
variations in poverty outcomes that are based on additively separable poverty measures.  This is 
in  fact  true  for  all  additively  separable  social  evaluation  functions  (e.g.  Atkinson  welfare 
function). 
3.3 Accounting for the Contribution of Unobservables 
  Recall that, on the basis of equation (8), there are at least two potential components 
to  the  contribution  of  unobservable  characteristics  into  changes  in  the  outcome 
distribution.  The first relates to changes in the returns to unobservables and the second to 
the distribution of these characteristics.  All the decomposition methods discussed so far 
lump the first component together with the returns to observables in the structural effect.  
Furthermore,  the  contribution  of  changes  in  the  distribution  of  unobservable 
characteristics is ruled out either by the ignorability assumption or by the zero conditional 
mean assumption.  The issue now is: Under what conditions can we identify these effects 
that, up to now, have been swept under the rug so to speak? 
  Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1993) assume additive linearity for the outcome model 
and  conditional  rank  preservation  in  order  to  decompose  differences  in  outcome 
distributions  in  a  way  that  accounts  for  the  contribution  of  unobservables23.    Under 
                                                           
23 In  the  context  of  treatment  effect  analysis,  the  assumption  of  rank preservation, also  known  as  rank 
invariance, is used to  identify  quantile treatment effects (QTE).   The assumption  implies that, given two 
mutually exclusive states of the world, the outcome at the τth quantile of the outcome distribution in one state 28 
 
additive linearity, the function defining the outcome variable is separable in x and ε.  We 
can therefore write the outcome model as follows: 
                                         (30) 
Where           , some function of unobservable characteristics. 
  The assumption of conditional rank preservation means that a given individual has 
the  same  rank  in  the  distribution  of    as  in  the  distribution  of   ,  conditional  on  her 
observable characteristics.  To see this formally, let             stand for the distribution of 
   conditional  on   .    Also,  let                        be  the  rank  of  individual  i  with 
observed  characteristics  xi  in  the  conditional  distribution  of    given  x,  and          
             her  rank  in  the  conditional  distribution  of    given  x.    Conditional  rank 
preservation says that                  .  Fortin, Lemieux and Firpo (2011) explain that one 
can secure conditional rank invariance by assuming ignorability and that the functions    
are strictly increasing in ε.  In other words, these functions are monotonic24. 
  As expected, separability allows the analyst to construct counterfactuals separately 
for  observables  and  unobservables.    To  see  what  is  involved,  consider  the  case  of  a 
particular individual, i, with outcome                   in period 1.  Let    
   represent what 
the residual part of the outcome would have been, had the unobservable characteristics of 
this individual been treated as in the initial period,  ceteris paribus.  The corresponding 
counterfactual  for  the  full  outcome  is:    
               
  .    Comparing  this  counterfactual 
with  the  observed  outcome  reveals  the  contribution  of  changes  in  the  returns  to 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
has its counterpart at the same quantile of the outcome distribution in the alternative state.  Bitler et al. 
(2006) explain that when this assumption fails, the QTE approach identifies and estimates the difference 
between the quantiles and not the quantiles of the difference in outcome distributions.  Rank preservation is 
akin to anonymity or symmetry used to base growth incidence analysis on cross-section data instead of panel 
data.   Anonymity implies that when comparing two outcome distributions, the identity of the  individual 
experiencing a particular outcome is irrelevant (Carneiro, Hansen and Heckman 2002).  Thus, a permutation 
of outcomes between any two individuals in any of the two distributions being compared has no effect on the 
comparison.  One might as well then compare such distributions across quantiles. 
24 Recall that ignorability means that the conditional distribution of ε is the same across groups (or periods).  
Thus individuals with the same set of observable characteristics find themselves at the same rank in both 
(conditional)  distributions.    It  is  well  known  that  a  monotonic  transformation  preserves  order.    In  fact, 
Rapoport (1999) defines a monotone transformation as “a formula that changes the numbers of one set to the 
numbers of another set while preserving their relative positions on the axis of real numbers.”  Since    is 
obtained from ε through a monotonic transformation      , rank preservation must therefore follow. 29 
 
unobservable  characteristics  of  individual  i  in  the  overall  change  in  her  outcome.    We 
denote  this  by:     
              
                
   .    Next,  we  replace    with    in  the 
expression  for    
  .  This operation  yields  the  following  counterfactual:    
               
  .  
Let     
        
       
  .  This term is equivalent to     
                 and clearly shows the 
contribution of changes in the returns to observable characteristics.   Thus, separability 
along with ignorability and monotonicity make it possible to split the structural effect into 
a component due to changes in the returns to observables and the other linked solely to 
changes in returns to unobservables.  In other words, the total structural effect25 is equal 
to:   
        
        
  .  The  observable  composition  effect   
  can  be  identified  residually 
from the following expression:   
      
      
      
  where   
               .  The assumption 
of  conditional  independence  implies  however  that   
     .    Recall  that  this  assumption 
implies  that  the  conditional  distribution  of  unobservables  does  not  vary  across  groups 
(periods).  Therefore, under the prevailing identifying assumptions, the difference between 
the  overall  outcome  difference  and  the  structural  effect  identifies  the  observable 
composition effect. 
The question now is, how does one identify    
  ?  This is where rank preservation 
comes in.  This assumption leads to the following imputation rule. 
     
         
                              (31) 
This imputation rule says that, for individual i in the end period, the counterfactual for the 
residual outcome is equal to the residual outcome associated with the individual located at 
the same rank in the conditional distribution of residual outcomes in the base period.  In 
practice,  one  would  estimate  β0  and  β1  using  OLS.    Bourguignon  and  Ferreira  (2005) 
                                                           
25 Note that the structural effect can also be expressed as   
             
  .  In the notation associated with 
equation  (8),  linearity  and  rank  preservation  imply  that    
   corresponds  to  the  counterfactual  outcome 
obtained by replacing the outcome structure φ1(∙) with φ0(∙).  In other words,    
   is the same as       .  This 
suggests that the Juhn-Murphy-Pierce (1993) decomposition can be performed in two steps as follows.  Start 
with  the  overall  difference   
               .    Then  add  to  and  subtract  from  this  difference  the 
counterfactual  outcome    
  .    This  yields  a  twofold  decomposition  of  the  overall  difference  into  the 
composition and structural effects.  Finally add to and subtract from the structural effect the counterfactual 
outcome    
  .    This  step  leads  to  the  final  threefold  decomposition.    Ignorability  guarantees  that  the 
composition effect is due solely to changes in the distribution of observables. 30 
 
explain that empirical implementation of a rank-preserving transformation is complicated 
by the fact that both samples do not necessarily have the same number of observations.  
However,  if  one  is  willing  to  assume  that  both  distributions  are  the  same  up  to  some 
proportional  transformation,  then  the  rank-preserving  transformation  can  be 
approximated  by  multiplying  residuals  in  the  base  period  by  the  ratio  of  the  standard 
deviation in the end period to the one in the initial period. 
  Fortin,  Lemieux  and  (2011)  point  out  that  assuming  constant  returns  to 
unobservable and homoskedasticity allows one to write the unobserved component of the 
outcome  as         .    Homoskedasticity  implies  that  the  conditional  variance  of  ε  is 
constant (and can be normalized to 1).  Equation (30) can therefore be written as follows. 
                                          (32) 
As it turns out, this is the version of the model used by Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) in 
their study of the evolution of the wage differential between Blacks and Whites in the U.S.A.  
In that context, the standard deviation of the residuals in the wage equation stands for both 
within-group inequality in the wage distribution and the price of unobserved skills (Yun 
2009). 
  The outcome model specified in equation (32) has also been used to study gender 
pay gap.  In that context, t=1 is taken to represent males while t=0 stands for females, and 
the wage regime for males is considered the non-discriminatory one.  The counterfactual 
used in the decomposition is the outcome female workers would have experienced if they 
had been paid like their male counterparts.  Care must be taken when applying this version 
of the model to decompose differences in mean outcome using OLS since the OLS residuals 
sum up to zero.  To see this, consider the following expression of standard Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition that explicitly shows the residuals. 
  
                                                                            (33) 
The terms associated with the unobservables in the right hand side of equation (33) will 
disappears if the decomposition is based on OLS applied to each equation separately. 31 
 
To get around this issue, Juhn, Murphy and Pierce (1991) assume that the returns to 
observable characteristics are the same for both groups and apply OLS to only one group, 
and construct an auxiliary equation for the other group.  In the context of gender wage gap 
studies, OLS is applied to the equation for males only.  The equation for female workers is 
constructed as follows:               .  The implied decomposition is: 
    
                                                              (34) 
where     
  
  
.  The above expression is computed on the basis of the sample analogs of the 
parameters of interest.  The first term in the twofold decomposition presented in (34) 
represents the predicted gap while the second stands for the residual gap.  As Yun (2009) 
points out, the residual gap is equal to the structural effect in the standard Oaxaca-Blinder 
decomposition.  Yet, this structural effect represents returns to observable characteristics.  
It  is  therefore  hard  to  see  how  the  Juhn,  Murphy  and  Pierce  (1991)  procedure  helps 
identify  the  contribution  of  unobservables.  Yun  (2009)  proposes  instead  the 
decomposition defined by equation (33), under the assumption that the expected value of 
unobservable  terms  is  not  equal  to  zero.    However,  that  author  does  not  provide  an 
implementation procedure corresponding to this situation. 
4.  Behavioral Responses to Changes in the Socioeconomic Environment 
 
A key limitation of both the basic Oaxaca-Blinder decomposition and its generalization 
along the lines discussed in sections 2 and 3 is that they do not account for changes in the 
behavior of agents in response to changes in their socioeconomic environment which may be due 
to shocks or policy reform.  Given the maintained hypothesis that the living standard of an 
individual in a given society depends crucially on what he decides to do with his assets (innate 
and external) subject to the opportunities offered by society,  this section focuses on ways of 
modeling  agents’  behavior  to  account  for  their  reaction  to  changes  in  their  socioeconomic 
environment.  Standard  economic  theory  explains  behavior  in  terms  of  the  principles  of 
optimization and  market interaction.   Modeling  behavior  entails  the  specification  of  the 
following elements (Varian 1984): (i) actions that a socioeconomic agent can undertake, 
(ii)  the  constraints  she  faces,  and  (iii)  the  objective  function  used  to  evaluate  feasible 
actions.  The assumption that the agent seeks to maximize the objective function subject to 32 
 
constraints implies that outcome variables used to represent the consequences of behavior 
can be expressed as functions of parameters of the socioeconomic environment, embedded 
in the constraints facing the agent.  We consider two basic modeling frameworks, namely 
the  consumption-leisure  choice  paradigm  and  the  Roy  (1951)  model  of  choice  and 
consequences.  While  both  frameworks  stem  from  the  optimization  principle,  the 
consumption-leisure  choice  model  is  a  straight  forward  interpretation  of  standard 
consumer  choice  theory  in  cases  where  the  choice  set  is  continuous.    The  Roy  model 
applies to discrete choice problems. 
4.1. The Consumption-Leisure Choice Paradigm 
  We first describe the structure of this framework and then explain how counterfactual 
decomposition can be performed on the basis of an empirical model.  Known limitations of the 
framework will also be noted along the way. 
Structure 
  Standard  neoclassical  labor  supply  models  are  framed  within  the  logic  of  individual 
choice between consumption goods, c, and leisure, ℓ.  This framework helps one establish the 
determinants of labor supply and the conditions for participation in the labor market.  Given a 
wage rate, w, and non-wage income y, the consumer is assumed to maximize a utility function of 
consumption and leisure subject to the full income constraint based on time endowment.  Let ℓmax 
be the time endowment representing the maximum amount of leisure the agent can enjoy.  The 
length of time worked is equal to:             .  Formally, the agent’s problem can be stated 
as:                         .  Equivalently, we have the following representation in terms of 
the indirect utility function. 
                                                        (35) 
where p stands for the price of consumption normalized to unity in the budget constraint and m0 
defines full income.  This formulation of the problem suggests that the wage rate is viewed both 
as the price and the opportunity cost of leisure.  Two basic income sources determine the choice 
set  along  with  the  price  of  consumption  and  the  wage  rate.  These  are  activities  within  and 
without the labor market. 
The solution to the above optimization problem will lead to an observed supply of labor 
that is greater or equal to zero indicating respectively participation and nonparticipation in the 
labor market.  Whether or not the agent decides to participate in the labor market depends on a 33 
 
comparison of the wage rate with the trade-off she is willing to make between consumption and 
leisure  as  characterized  by  her  utility  function  (Cahuc  and  Zylberberg  2004).    Within  this 
standard model, it is assumed that both consumption and leisure are normal goods and that the 
agent is willing to sacrifice less and less consumption for each extra unit of leisure.  The rate at 
which the agent is willing to trade leisure for consumption is indicated by the marginal rate of 
substitution defined by:       
       
        .  The agent is willing to supply labor as long as the 
marginal rate of substitution is less than the market wage rate.  At the optimum, the marginal rate 
of substitution is equal to the wage rate
26.  Thus the wage rate at which the agent finds it optimal 
to supply zero hours of work is known as the  shadow or the reservation wage (Deaton and 
Muellbaouer 1980, Cahuc and Zylberberg 2004).  At this point, the agent has no labor income, so 
that the maximum value of consumption is equal to y0.  Since the time endowment is fixed, the 
reservation wage is a function mainly of non-labor income.  When leisure is a normal good, any 
policy that leads to an increase in non-wage income will increase the reservation wage and will 
thus  have  a  disincentive  effect  on  the  participation  decision.    The  reservation  wage  thus 
determines the conditions of participation in the labor market. 
  As an outcome of the optimization process described by (35), the Marshallian demand for 
leisure and the corresponding Marshallian supply of labor depend on two parameters, the wage 
rate, w, and full income m0 which also depends on the wage rate (the opportunity cost of leisure).  
It is important to note how a change in the wage (possibly induced by policy or other factors in 
the socioeconomic environment) might affect the supply of labor.  To be specific, consider an 
increase in the wage rate.  This increase will affect the demand for leisure through conventional 
substitution and income effects.  Since leisure is assumed to be a normal good, these two effects 
combine to reduce the demand for leisure hence to increase the supply of labor.  In addition to 
these effects, an increase in the wage rate increases the value of full or potential income.  This 
would induce an increase in leisure or a decrease in labor supply.  Cahuc and Zylberberg (2004) 
refer to the conventional income effect as the “indirect” income effect, and call “direct” income 
effect the one linked to potential income.  The overall effect of a change in the wage rate is 
                                                           
26 To see clearly what is involved, consider the case where MRSℓc<w.  This implies that the marginal utility of 
leisure is less than the leisure value of the marginal utility of consumption.  It is therefore desirable for the 
agent  to  increase  consumption  relative  to  leisure.    Assuming  decreasing  marginal  utility,  increasing 
consumption will progressively bring down the marginal value of consumption until equilibrium is reached 
indicating the optimal combination of consumption and leisure. 34 
 
therefore ambiguous.  It depends on which group of effects dominates.  In any case, the shape of 
the labor supply curve is determined by the interaction among these effects. 
Bourguignon  and  Ferreira  (2003)  expand  the  basic  framework  to  include  individual 
characteristics and the net tax system.  It is assumed that, an economic agent with characteristics 
z chooses between consumption and leisure (or labor supply) so as to maximize utility subject to 
a budget constraint that explicitly incorporate the net tax system
27.  Formally, the problem is 
stated as follows. 
                                                                         (36) 
In  this  expression,  nt(·)  represents  the  tax-benefit  schedule,  a  function  of  the  agent’s 
characteristics, his labor income (wh), his exogenous non-labor income (y), and possibly the 
level of labor supply, h.  The parameters defining the tax-benefit system such as tax rates or the 
means-testing  of  benefits  are  represented  by  ξ.    There  are  also  parameters  such  as  β  and  ε 
characterizing preferences along with agent’s characteristics, z. 
  Individuals are members of families or households.  One would expect that the family or 
the household will have a considerable influence on decisions made by its members, including 
labor supply decisions.  It is therefore instructive to consider how the basic model discussed so 
far has been adapted to account for the potential influence of the structure of the household to 
which  an  individual  belongs.    A  straightforward  extension  of  the  neoclassical  model  to 
household-level supply of labor has taken the form of the so-called unitary model (Blundell and 
MaCurdy 1999).  A key characterization of this model is the assumption of “income pooling” 
which implies that the level of household consumption is determined by the common pool of 
resources available for various household members.  The household can therefore be viewed as 
single agent with its own utility that depends on total consumption and individual members’ 
consumption of leisure.  Within this framework, individual labor supply functions depend on the 
household full income, the price of consumption and the wage rates. 
  The analysis of household choices can also be framed within the logic of the collective 
model.  This approach insists on the principle that choices made by a household must reflect the 
preferences of its members and is consistent with the assumption that individual decisions made 
                                                           
27 This constraint may also include the fixed cost of employment as a function of individual characteristics.  
This cost may include cost incurred for child-care while at work. Accounting for this dimension makes it 
possible to simulate the implications of policy designed to compensate individuals or households for child 
care (Creedy and Duncan 2002). 35 
 
within  the  household  are  Pareto  efficient  so  that  there  are  no  opportunities  for  mutually 
advantageous  allocation  (Cahuc  and  Zylberberg  2004).    In  the  context  of  this  framework, 
decisions made by individual i are an outcome of the following mathematical program. 
                                                                (37) 
where si is interpreted as a “sharing rule” determining the share that each household member gets 
out of total non-wage income of the household.  This variable is a function of the wage rate faced 
by the individual and her contribution in non-wage income.  Interestingly, this formulation offers 
the  possibility  of  inferring  the  consumption  of  individual  household  members  which  is  not 
necessarily observable.  Given the interdependence among choices of different members of the 
household, this approach makes it easier to understand why certain members of the household 
may choose to specialize in household production while others may supply their labor to relevant 
markets.  This interdependence also suggests that variations in individual’s income affect not 
only his labor supply decisions, but those of the other members of the household as well. 
  One key feature limiting the applicability of the basic model of consumption and leisure 
choice to the study of behavioral responses to shocks and policies is the assumption of a linear 
budget  constraint.    More  generally,  Deaton  and  Muellbauer  (1980)  argue  that  the  simple 
neoclassical labor supply model has limited usefulness for policy analysis because it does not 
account for issues related to aggregation, participation decisions, constraints on hours worked 
and unemployment.  With respect to the number of hours worked, Salanié (2003) notes that 
individual choice may be constrained by existing labor market regulations.  Furthermore, part 
time work may not be an outcome of free choice, but rather a reflection of the difficulty in 
finding full time employment.  It is therefore important to consider the participation decision. 
Counterfactual Decomposition 
In principle, the solution of the program specified in (36) for individual i (or a household 
depending  on  the  unit  of  analysis)  leads  to  a  simultaneous  equation  system  describing  the 
demand for consumption and leisure.  The demand for leisure can be translated into a labor 
supply function.  Given relevant data, the model composed of the consumption and labor supply 
can  be  estimated  simultaneously  first  using  baseline  data,  then  using  end  period  data.  
Counterfactual  simulations  can  then  be  conducted  by  switching  parameters  and  variables 
between the two estimated models in order to identify the effect of the factor that was changed 36 
 
while  holding  all  the  others  constant.  This,  again,  is  an  application  of  the  ceteris  paribus 
identification strategy. 
Bourguignon and Ferreira (2003), in the context of ex ante evaluation of policy reforms, 
propose a recursive approach that can be adapted to the types of decompositions considered here.  
These authors note that the program stated in equation (36) leads, for individual i, to a nonlinear 
labor supply function of the form: 
                       .                (38) 
where the εi are the idiosyncratic preference terms analogous to the random disturbance terms in 
standard regression analysis.  Given a reliable cross-section data set, estimation procedures seek 
to minimize the role of these idiosyncratic terms in explaining cross-sectional variations in labor 
supply.    This  will  produce  a  set  of  estimates      for  preference  parameters  and       for  the 
idiosyncratic preference terms.  The fact that the preference parameters have no subscript here 
implies that they are assumed common to all agents.  The estimated version of equation (38) can 
be written as follows. 
                             .              (39) 
Given a baseline estimate of the labor supply function, it is possible to simulate, for 
instance, the implications of alternative tax-benefit system for labor supply and consumption by 
changing relevant components of ξ, and comparing the new results to the base line.   
  To  fix  ideas,  let                                      be  the  labor  supply  observed  for 
individual i at time t=0, 1.  Consider an experiment where the tax system prevailing in the end 
period  is  imposed  on  agents  in  the  baseline  period,  ceteris  paribus.    Let 
                                   be the corresponding labor supply.  The change in labor supply 
due to this change is equal to the following. 
                                                                             (40) 
Under the simplifying assumption that consumption is equal to disposable income
28, the budget 
constraint implies that the corresponding change in consumption is equal to: 
                                                   (41) 
where                                                                 .  These changes in the 
indicator of economic welfare can then be used to compute the changes in poverty (or any other 
                                                           
28 No generality is lost here since one can always compute consumption as a fraction of disposable income. 37 
 
social evaluation function) corresponding to the underlying ceteris paribus variation in the tax-
benefit system.  While we used the tax benefit system to illustrate the principle, it is obvious that 
the  same  principle  applies  to  any  of  the  arguments  of  the  labor  supply  function,  be  it  an 
observable variable or an estimate of a parameter or term associated with preferences.  The case 
of  idiosyncratic  terms  deserves  special  attention  and  we  will  come  back  to  it  in  the  next 
subsection.  Also, the discussion assumes that the individual is the unit of analysis.  However, the 
general principle carries over to the unitary model of household behavior. 
  There are serious difficulties associated with the estimation of labor supply models based 
on this classical approach.  These difficulties stem mainly from the assumed continuity of the 
decision variable, hours of work, coupled with a lack of restrictions on this variable.  Salanié 
(2003) explains, in a simple framework, a structural estimation procedure applicable to this basic 
model.    The  optimization  process  underlying  the  labor  supply  function  has  two  possible 
outcomes.  The agent will supply zero hours if the reservation wage is greater than the market 
wage, otherwise he will supply labor up to the point where the marginal rate of substitution 
between consumption and leisure is equal to the wage rate.  This equality defines a latent labor 
supply function of the net wage rate, disposable non-labor income and an error term.  Since 
wages are observed only for people who work, a Tobit model of labor supply is estimated jointly 
with a wage equation that includes individual characteristics (observable and idiosyncratic). 
When a full tax-benefit system is included in the budget constraint, the marginal tax rate 
is increasing and the budget constraint is convex, one can define a virtual wage rate on the basis 
of the marginal tax rate and a virtual income based on this virtual wage in order to derived the 
labor supply from an optimization problem that maximizes utility subject to the virtual budget 
constraint.  The fact that the virtual wage and income are endogenous means that we should 
consider  instrumental  variable  or  maximum  likelihood  estimation  methods.    When  the  tax-
benefit system leads to non-convex budget constraints, one can no longer rely on first-order 
conditions to find the optimum.  The common approach is to consider discrete levels of labor 
supply such as h=0, 10, 20, 30, 40 (hours per week) and compare utility values over the choice 
set to find the maximum.  Creedy and Duncan (2002) review a series of estimation procedures 
that have been used in the empirical literature to deal with these difficulties.  They conclude that 
the structural discrete choice approach offers a more promising method.  We briefly outline that 
approach next, within the logic of the Roy (1951) model of choice and consequences. 38 
 
 
4.2. The Roy Model of Choice and Consequences 
  This section reviews the structure of the basic Roy model along with its interpretation in 
the context of modeling the determinants of the living standard as represented by household 
consumption  expenditure.    It  also  discusses  key  considerations  in  simulating  counterfactual 
distributions underlying any decomposition exercise. 
Structure and interpretations 
  Heckman and Honoré (1990) explain that the original Roy (1951) model was designed 
for the study of occupational choice and its implications for the distribution of earnings in an 
economy where agents are endowed with different sets of occupation-specific skills.  In that 
economy, income-maximizing agents can freely choose to work only in one of two activities, 
fishing and hunting, on the basis of their productivity in each.  Thus, an agent with a given skill 
endowment will choose to work in the sector where her potential income is higher.  There are no 
investment  opportunities  for  the  augmentation  of  sector-specific  skills  nor  are  there  costs 
associated with changing sectors.  These authors also show that self-selection implies a lower 
level  of  inequality  in  earnings  compared  to  a  benchmark  case  where  workers  are  randomly 
assigned  to  jobs.    The  fact  that  occupational  choice  has  significant  implications  for  the 
distribution of earnings makes the Roy model a relevant framework for the analysis of behavioral 
responses by agents to changes in their socioeconomic environment. 
  Heckman and Sedlacek (1985) discuss an extension of the basic framework by including 
nonmarket activity as an option in the choice set facing socioeconomic agents who are now 
assumed to maximize utility instead of income.  The utility of participating in each of the sectors 
depends on both sector-specific attributes such as the wage rate or employment risk and job 
status, and individual characteristics.  The fact that we observe only sectoral choices and not the 
underlying utility function means that it is possible to identify only parameters associated with 
differences in utility across sectors.  These authors also consider the contribution of self-selection 
to  income  inequality  and  find  that,  in  this  general  model,  self-selection  can  increase  both 
between and within sector inequality compared to a random allocation of workers to sectors. 
  At  the  most  fundamental  level,  the  Roy  model  is  characterized  by  two  components, 
namely, a selection mechanism and the associated potential outcomes.   These outcomes are 
possible  consequences  of  the  choice  made  through  the  selection  mechanism.    The  extended 39 
 
version of the Roy model is consistent with discrete choice models to the extent that utility 
maximizing agents face a discrete choice set.  Train (2009) characterizes a discrete choice model 
in terms of two fundamental elements: the choice set and the decision process (or the decision 
rule).  The choice set is the collection of alternatives from which the decision maker chooses one.  
This set must be exhaustive in the sense that it must include all possible alternatives, the latter 
being mutually exclusive from the perspective of the decision maker.  Finally, the number of 
alternatives must be finite.  In the case of discrete models of labor supply, for instance, the choice 
set can be represented by a few options such as not working, working part-time and working full 
time. 
Just as in the case of the consumption-leisure paradigm, the decision process assumes 
utility-maximizing  behavior.    It  is  therefore  assumed  that  the  decision  maker  chooses  the 
alternative that provides the greatest net benefit or utility.  Let                be the utility 
agent h gets from alternative j.  The decision rule implies that alternative k is chosen by the agent 
if and only if                 .  This decision making process is usually framed within the logic 
of the random utility model where utility has two parts.  The first, known as the representative 
utility,  is  a  function  of  some  observable  characteristics  of  the  decision  maker  and  of  the 
alternatives (Train 2009).  The second component is a set of non-observable random factors.  
Formally, the utility function is written as;                 where   is the representative utility 
and  represents the unobserved portion of utility that is treated as random.  Now, the statement 
that alternative k is chosen if and only if                  can be equivalently expressed as: k is 
chosen if and only if                                 .  Because of the uncertainty implied by 
the random part of the utility function, one can only make probabilistic statements about the 
decision maker’s choice.  The probability that option k is chosen by agent h is defined by the 
following expression
29: 
                                                      (42) 
                                                           
29 The expression of this probability can be made more precise by considering an indicator function for the 
decision rule.  The indicator is equal to 1 when option k is chosen and 0 otherwise.  The probability that the 
agent chooses option k is then equal to the expected value of this indicator function over all possible values of 
the unobserved factors.  In other words,                                                   . This is in fact a 
multidimensional  integral  over  the  joint  density  of  the  random  vector  the  elements  of  which  represent 
unobserved factors associated with each alternative.  This probability can be interpreted as the proportion of 
people within the population who face the same observable utility as h for each alternative and choose k 
(Train 2009). 40 
 
The  type  of  discrete  choice  model  derived  from  the  above  probability  statement  is 
determined by the assumptions made about the distribution of the unobserved portion of the 
utility function.  For instance, the common logit model assumes  that the random factors are 
independently and identically distributed (iid) extreme value variables for all options.  In other 
words, each choice is independent from the others
30. 
Coulombe and McKay (1996) provide an interesting interpretation of the Roy model that 
is consistent with our maintained hypothesis that the living standard of an individual is a pay-off 
from her participation in the life of society.  Using the household as the unit of analysis, th ese 
authors  argue  that  the  living  standard  of  a  household  depends  fundamentally  on  the 
socioeconomic group to which it belongs (or their economic activity status).  To frame this view 
within the logic of the Roy model, the author s  further argue that one need s to explain th e 
selection  mechanism leading to the observed   socioeconomic group, and conditional on that 
choice, the determinants of the living standard in that group.  This logic leads to a two-equation 
model, one representing the selection mechanism and the second mod eling the living standard 
conditional on the choice of a particular socioeconomic group. 
Modeling the selection mechanism boils down to modeling the probability defined in 
equation (42).  Consistent with the random utility framework underlying this express ion, and 
assuming  that  the  random  elements  are  generated  independently  by  an  extreme  value 
distribution, the multinomial logit model can be used to explain the probability of choosing an 
option.  Formally, we express that probability as: 
     
           
                  
                     (43) 
where zhj is the set of relevant explanatory variables and m is the total number of socioeconomic 
groups.  The probability defined in (43) is essentially the propensity score. 
The  specification  of  the  explanatory  variables  requires  a  good  understanding  of  the 
determinants of the choice of a socioeconomic group.  Autor (2009) explains that there are three 
                                                           
30 The generalized extreme value model (GEV) allows correlation among unobserved factors.  The standard 
multinomial logit assumes that the random factors are iid with a double exponential distribution.  The probit 
model assumes that the random factors are jointly distributed normal variables.  Train (2009) points out that 
the identification of discrete choice models relies heavily on the fact that only differences in utility matter and 
the scale of utility is irrelevant.  Hence, only parameters that capture differences across alternatives are 
identifiable and therefore estimable.  This also implies that characteristics of the decision maker that do not 
vary across alternatives will have no effect unless they are specified in a way that induces differences in 
utility  over  alternatives.    Glick  and  Sahn  (2006)  handle  this  problem  by  indexing  the  coefficients  of 
sociodemographic variables in the representative utility function. 41 
 
technological factors that affect this choice in the context of the general Roy model, namely: (i) 
the distribution of skills and abilities, (ii) the correlations among these skills in the population 
and (iii) the technologies for applying these skills.  Coulombe and McKay (1996) make a similar 
point in a case study of Mauritania.  They define socioeconomic groups in terms of the income-
generating opportunities available to households and their members.  In particular, they consider 
four  mutually  exclusive  and  exhaustive  groups  of  households:  (i)  households  working 
predominantly as employees (whether in the public or private sector), (ii) those engaged mostly 
in self-employment in agriculture, (iii) those engaged mainly in non-farm self-employment, and 
(iv) those not in the labor force.  In essence, socioeconomic groups are determined on the basis 
of the main economic activity of the household or the main source of income. 
As to the determinants of the choice of socioeconomic groups, these authors argue that 
the  choice  depend  on  variables  (such  as  education,  wage  or  profit  rates)  that  affect  relative 
returns from economic activities as well as on consumption preferences.  In particular, they make 
the  point  that  the  extent  to  which  household  members  choose  self-employment  over  wage 
employment  or  to  stay  out  of  the  labor  market  depends  on  the  interaction  between  total 
household labor supply within and outside the household (a consumption decision) and it total 
labor demand ( a production decision) for both household members and hired labor.  In other 
words, the socioeconomic classification of the household reflects both consumption parameters 
such as the demographic composition of the household and the characteristics of the head of 
household,  and  production  parameters  relevant  to  self-employment  such  as  fixed  inputs  and 
variable costs. 
  Equation  (43)  models  the  selection  mechanism.    We  need  an  outcome  equation  to 
complete the model within the logic of the Roy framework.  Following Coulombe and McKay 
(1996), we let yhk stand for the log of per capita expenditure for household h in socioeconomic 
group k, and ηhk a random disturbance.  The outcome equation associated with equation (43) can 
be written by analogy to the standard Mincer equation (in labor economics) as follows. 
                                    (44) 
Equations (43) and (44) constitute a system designed to explain living standard at the household 
level.    In  their  case  study,  Coulombe  and  McKay  (1996)  distinguish  two  categories  of 
determinants, demographic factors that are relevant to all households regardless of the group they 
belong to.  These demographic variables include household size, household composition, and 42 
 
characteristics of the economic head of the household (e.g. education level, marital status, gender 
and  ethnicity).    Group  specific  factors  include  those  affecting  the  level  of  total  household 
income.  For those engaged in wage employment, such factors would include level of education, 
sector of employment and numbers of hours worked in a year to account for seasonal work.  
Given that such variables are difficult to measure at the household level (the unit of analysis), 
one could define and measure these variables only for the economic head of household or adopt 
some form of aggregation over household members.  Naturally, this would entail some loss of 
the heterogeneity found at the individual level.  In the case of agricultural self-employment, 
specific  factors  include  such  things  as  land  size  and  quality,  tenure  status,  use  of  fertilizer, 
insecticides,  hired  labor,  access  to  extension  services  and  commercialization.    Similar 
considerations  apply  to  non-agricultural  self-employment.    For  households  outside  the  labor 
market,  possible  sources  of  livelihood  include  assets  holding,  borrowing,  public  and  private 
transfers. 
  Another important consideration here is the classification of variables as exogenous or 
endogenous.  This classification hinges on the time horizon chosen.  Coulombe and McKay 
(1996)  note,  for  instance,  that  in  the  long  run  the  living  standard  can  affect  demographic 
variables such as household size and composition.  But in the short run it is reasonable to think 
of the direction of influence as running from demographic variables to the living standard.  In 
their study, these authors adopt a short to medium time frame so that most of the variables listed 
above are considered exogenous with respect to the model described by equation (43) and (44). 
Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2008) show how to expand this framework to model 
changes in education and household demographics.  In the extended framework, socioeconomic 
group,  per  capita  consumption,  education  and  household  composition  are  endogenous.  
Variations in education and in household composition are modeled within the discrete choice 
framework portrayed by equation (43).  In that particular application, the demand for education 
is modeled on the basis of six alternatives: 0 years of schooling; 1-4; 5-6; 7-8; 9-12; and 13 and 
more.  The highest level of education is the excluded category.  The variables considered as 
purely exogenous by these authors include: number of adults in the households, the region of 
residence, age, race and gender.  For household demographics, the options are: 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5 and 
more  children.  The  last  category  is  omitted  in  the  estimation.  Note  that  education  is  an 
explanatory variable in the demographic multilogit model.  Leite, Sanchez and Laderchi (2009) 43 
 
apply this extended framework to analyze the evolution of urban inequality in Ethiopia.  They 
too focus on the household as the unit of analysis and use per capita household expenditure as 
the outcome variable. 
  Cogneau and Robilliard (2008) use the extended Roy model to study the implications of 
targeted poverty reduction policies in Madagascar
31.  While using the household as the unit of 
analysis and considering consumption as the ultimate welfare indicator, these authors model first 
the income-generating process at the level of individual members of the household, and then link 
consumption to household income.  The choice set facing individuals of working age (15 years 
and older) includes three alternatives: family work, self-employment and wage work.  Household 
composition  and location are exogenously  given.  For self-employment  and wage  work, the 
potential earnings of an individual are equal to a task price times a given idiosyncratic amount of 
efficient labor.  Efficient labor is assumed to be a function of some observable characteristics 
(such as age, experience and location) and unobservable skills.  Family work is rewarded by a 
reservation wage that is a function of individual and household characteristics
32.  In the absence 
of labor market segmentation, the simple selection rule of the basic Roy model would base sector 
choice on a comparison of the reservation wage, and potential wages in the other two sectors.  To 
account for labor market segmentation, Cogneau and Robilliard (2008) define a segmentation 
variable in terms of the relative cost of entry between self -employment and wage work, and 
adjust the selection rule accordingly. 
  For the purpose of policy evaluation, these authors embed the occupational choice 
model  into  a  broader  microeconomic  module  that  includes  the  demand  system  for 
consumption  goods.    To  keep  things  simple,  they  assume  that  consumption  or  saving 
decisions are separable from labor supply decisions.  They also assume a fixed common 
saving rate of 0.052 so that aggregate consumption is equal to the implied propensity to 
consume times disposable income.  The latter is the sum of farm profits, labor income, 
earnings from self-employment, and nonlabor income such as capital income and transfers.  
Total  consumption  is  allocated  to  three  composite  goods  (agricultural,  informal  and 
                                                           
31 These include (i) a direct subsidy on agricultural production prices, (ii) a workfare program and (iii) a 
uniform untargeted per capita transfer program. 
32 For agricultural households, earnings are computed on the basis of a reduced farm profit function (based 
on Cobb-Douglas technology) that includes self -consumption and accounts for hired   labor.  For family 
members participating in farm work, the reservation wage (a measure of the value of family work) is 
assumed to depend on their contribution to farm profits. 44 
 
formal)  according  to  budget  shares  derived  from  available  data.    The  three  policies 
considered have the potential of inducing large macroeconomic effects, because their cost 
represents  about  5 percent  of  gross  domestic  product  (GDP).    To  account  for  this,  the 
authors link the micro module to a small three-sector (agriculture, informal and formal) 
computable general equilibrium model.  The integrated framework makes it possible to 
consider  the  macroeconomic  impact  of  the  policy  options  along  with  their  impact  on 
inequality and poverty.  Adding a general equilibrium model removes a key limitation of 
the decomposition methods discussed up to this point.  These methods rely on either a 
purely statistical or a microeconomic model of behavior that cannot account for general 
equilibrium effects. 
Simulating Counterfactual Distributions 
  The  simulation  of  counterfactual  distributions  needed  for  the  decomposition  of 
distributional changes proceeds in the same manner as in the case of the simultaneous model of 
consumption and labor supply discussed above.  We need to estimate some version of the Roy 
system  (composed of a selection  equation  and an outcome equation)  for the initial  and end 
periods.    Counterfactual  distributions  can  then  be  simulated  by  switching  parameters  and 
variables between these two estimated models one element at a time holding all the other factors 
constant. 
  In general, parameters of sample selection models can be estimated with two-stage 
methods or the maximum likelihood approach.  We focus here on two-step procedures that 
are  also  known  as  control function methods or generalized residual methods (Todd 2008).  As 
noted earlier, the selection mechanism is usually modeled within a random utility framework and 
identifying  assumptions  are  based  on  functional  form  restrictions  or  exclusion  restrictions 
(analogous to the instrumental variable approach).  In particular, the control function approach 
seeks to model conditional expectations of potential outcomes (given observable characteristics 
and occupational or socioeconomic status) in a way that relates unobservable determinants of 
outcomes to the observables, including the choice of a socioeconomic group.  This is consistent 
with the view that the underlying endogeneity problem is due to omitted variables.  The control 
functions represent the omitted variables.  To fix ideas, consider a two-sector Roy model.  Let d 45 
 
be a dummy variable indicating the sector of activity.  Thus we let d=1 for sector 1 (e.g. fishing) 
and d=2 for sector two (hunting)
33 with the corresponding potential outcomes y1 and y2. 
  Given  observable  characteristics  x,  z  and  socioeconomic  status,  d,  the  conditional 
expectations of these potential outcomes can be written as: 
                                                   (45) 
Similarly, 
                                                   (46) 
Heckman and Navarro-Lozano (2004) explain that if one can model                 and 
                and find a way to cause these functions to vary independently of       
and      , then  one  can  identify       and       up  to  constant  terms.  This  is  another 
manifestation of the separability condition discussed earlier in section 3. 
  Consistent with the random utility framework underlying the selection model, we 
assume  that  d=2  if  some  underlying  index  u              is  greater  than  zero.  
Furthermore, if we assume that               , then we have: 
                                                        (47) 
where                         is  the  propensity  score.    Similarly,  assuming  that 
               yields the following relation. 
                                                        (48) 
  This approach is consistent with the view that the underlying endogeneity problem 
is due to omitted variables.  The control functions represent the omitted variables.  The key 
assumption in this framework that allows us to express each control function Kj(∙), j=1, 2 
solely as a function of P(x, z) is the assumption that the observed individual characteristics 
are independent of the unobservable determinants of selection and outcomes (a form of 
ignorability)  .    This  assumption,  along  with  the  rest  of  imposed  restrictions,  isolates  a 
                                                           
33 We avoid using the traditional coding (0, 1) because we reserve it for the base and end periods respectively. 46 
 
source of identifying variation in selection which helps to determine the parameters of 
interest.  The assumption is formally stated as follows: 
                                   (49) 
Under these assumptions, the conditional expectations for the potential outcome are equal 
to the following. 
                                                (50) 
Similarly, 
                                                (51) 
If we can use z to vary each control function holding x fixed, we can identify       and 
     .  We note that these control functions are designed to control for selection bias in the 
estimation of the relevant parameters. 
  In the context of Heckman (1976, 1979) two-stage estimator, the control function is 
known as the inverse Mills ratio.  Hall (2002) points out the following drawbacks: (1) The 
conventional standard error estimates are inconsistent, (2) the method does not impose 
the constraint that the absolute value of the correlation coefficient be less than one, (3) 
since the normality assumption is required for consistency, the estimator is no more robust 
than  the  full  maximum  likelihood  approach  that  also  requires  normality.  Lee  (1983) 
proposes an alternative way of estimating the inverse Mills ratio, particularly when  one 
does not assume normality for the random error in the selection equation.  This involves a 
general transformation to normality as follows.  Let qτ be the quantiles associated with the 
predicted probabilities from the first stage of the process.  The transformation computes 
these quantiles by inverting the cumulative standard normal distribution applied to the 
predicted probabilities.  This is essentially an imputation procedure analogous to the one 
discussed in section 3. 
  Once the model has been estimated, counterfactual decompositions are performed 
following the same logic as in the case of the consumption-leisure model.  Building on the 
statistical approaches discussed in section 3, Bourguignon, Ferreira and Leite (2008) propose 47 
 
the  combination  of  parametric  and  nonparametric  techniques  in  constructing  the  desired 
counterfactuals.  To see clearly what is involved, recall that the density function characterizing 
the joint distribution of the outcomes and covariates can be written as a product of the two 
underlying density functions, one characterizing the conditional distribution of outcomes 
given  the  covariates  and  the  other  the  joint  distribution  of  covariates.    Earlier,  we 
expressed  this  relation  as:                               .    As  noted  earlier,  this 
factorization suggests that counterfactual distributions can be obtained by combining the 
conditional  outcome  distribution  from  one  period  (e.g.  initial  period)  with  the  joint 
distribution of covariates from the other period (e.g. the end period).  An example of this 
type of combinations would be the following: 
     
                                      (52) 
A key distinction between the methods discussed in section 3 and those reviewed in 
this section is that methods in section 3 are based on statistical models of the conditional 
outcome distribution while the methods discussed here rely on economic modeling of this 
conditional distribution.  Thus, equations (43) and (44) characterizing the basic Roy model 
must be seen as modeling the conditional outcome distribution        .  The method of 
Bourguignon,  Ferreira  and  Leite  (2008)  consists  in  using  the  parametric  approach  in 
generating counterfactuals for the conditional outcome distribution and non-parametric 
sample  reweighing  techniques  to  construct  counterfactuals  for  the  joint  distribution  of 
exogenous  covariates.  They  argue  that  the  parametric  approach  for  the  conditional 
distribution  has  the  advantage  of  providing  a  clear  economic  interpretation  of  the 
parameter estimates along with great flexibility in exchanging parameters from one period 
to another (i.e. from one state of the world to another). 
  To see how this works in the context of the Roy framework, use the estimated model 
to write the approximation to the conditional outcome distribution as follows: 
                                                        (53) 
Thus a change in the conditional outcome distribution due to a ceteris paribus change in the 
parameters of the multinomial logit model of selection can be computed easily as follows. 
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When a counterfactual requires a normalization of exogenous covariates for both periods, 
we  can  simply  apply  the  DiNardo,  Fortin  and  Lemieux  (1996)  approach  described  in 
section 2.  The handling of the residuals in this process requires some care.  In the case of 
the residuals associated with the outcome equations, for instance, one can resort to the 
rank-preserving transformation described in section 3. 
 
5. Concluding Remarks 
 
  The design and implementation of effective strategies for poverty reduction require 
a relevant and reliable analytical input.  The bedrock of this analytical input is certainly a 
rich  and  reliable  data  set  (both  qualitative  and  quantitative)  to  be  used  in  poverty 
measurement and analysis.  In this context, there is a need for a sound understanding of the 
fundamental factors that account for observed variations in poverty either across space or 
over  time.    This  paper  reviews  some  of  the  basic  decomposition  methods  that  are 
commonly used to identify sources of variation in poverty outcomes, both at the macro and 
micro  levels.    The  paper  focuses  on  micro  approaches  because  macro  methods  fail  to 
account for the heterogeneity of the factors that drive the observed changes in aggregate 
poverty. 
  The decomposition of changes in poverty can be viewed as an exercise in social 
impact  evaluation  understood  as  an  assessment  of  changes  in  individual  and  social 
outcomes  attributable  to  socioeconomic  shocks  or  policy  implementation.    All 
decomposition  methods  reviewed  in  this  paper  obey  the  same  logic  of  counterfactual 
decomposition  organized  around  the  following  terms:  domain,  outcome  model,  scope, 
identification and estimation.  The domain represents the type of distributional changes a 
method seeks to decompose (e.g. changes in poverty over time or across space). 
The  outcome model  links  the  outcome  of  interest  to  its  determining  factors.    As 
shown in the appendix, some macro-decomposition methods link variations in poverty to 
changes in the mean and relative inequality characterizing the underlying distribution of 
living  standards.  Others  exploit  the  structure  of  additively  decomposable  measures  to 
decompose  such  variations  into  an intrasectoral  effect  and  an  effect  due  to  population 
shifts.  Outcome models that underlie micro-decomposition methods are consistent with 
the view that the living standard of an individual is a pay-off from her participation in the 49 
 
life of society, and a function of endowments, behavior and the circumstances that determine 
the returns to these endowments from any social transaction.  These elements define the 
potential scope of micro-decomposition methods.  In general, the scope of a decomposition 
method is the set of explanatory factors the method tries to uncover by decomposition.  
The  specification  of  an  outcome  model  thus  determines  the  potential  scope  of  the 
corresponding decomposition method. 
The  micro-decomposition  methods  reviewed  in  this  paper  fall  into  two  basic 
categories, namely statistical and structural.  All seek to model the joint distribution of the 
outcome variable and its determining factors.  This joint distribution can be factorized into 
a  product  of  the  conditional  outcome  distribution  and  the  marginal  distribution  of 
exogenous  (independent)  variables.    Statistical  methods  rely  uniquely  on  statistical 
principles to model the conditional outcome distribution while structural methods rely on 
both economics and statistics to model this object.  In particular, the structural methods 
considered here use utility maximization in a partial equilibrium setting to characterize 
individual  behavior  and  social  interaction.    Statistical  methods  therefore  are  purely 
descriptive, while structural ones are considered predictive. 
Identification concerns the assumptions needed to recover, in a meaningful way, the 
factors of interest at the population level.  These assumptions involve both the functional 
form  of  the  outcome  model  and  the  joint  distribution  of  factors  that  determine  the 
outcome.  While macro- and micro-decomposition methods differ in their scope, they share 
the  same  fundamental  identification  strategy  based  on  the  notion  of  ceteris  paribus 
variation.  The implementation of this idea entails the comparison of an observed outcome 
distribution with a counterfactual obtained by changing one factor at a time while holding 
all the other factors constant.  A key counterfactual used in the identification of endowment 
and price effects is the outcome distribution that would have prevailed in one state of the 
world had individual characteristics been rewarded according to the system applicable in 
the alternative state.  The construction of this counterfactual relies critically on ignorability 
and the absence of general equilibrium effects.  When the outcome model is separable in 
observables and unobservables, one can assume rank preservation to further split the price 
effect into a component due to observables and another due to unobservable factors. 50 
 
Estimation  involves  the  computation  of  the  relevant  parameters  on  the  basis  of 
sample data.  There is a powerful analogy between the decomposition methods reviewed 
here and treatment effect analysis.  Both fields of inquiry rely on the same fundamental 
identification strategy, and the structural effect is known to be equivalent to the treatment 
effect on the treated.    This  analogy  has  led  to  the  development  of  flexible  estimation 
methods for endowment and structural effects.  Nonparametric estimation methods, such 
as  inverse probability weighing, allow the analyst  to  decompose  distributional  changes 
without  having  to  assume  a  functional  form  for  the  outcome  model.  The  downside 
however  is  the  inability  to  further  decompose  the  structural  effect  and  to  account  for 
behavior.  Parametric methods are more suitable for these two tasks. 
While the analogy between decomposition methods and treatment effect analysis 
has helped with the development of estimation methods, it does not necessarily confer a 
causal interpretation  to  decomposition  results.  As  noted  by  Ferreira  (2010),  such  an 
interpretation requires the construction of counterfactual outcome distributions that are 
fully consistent with a general equilibrium of the economy.  One  way of achieving this 
consistency  is  to  base  decomposition  on  a  full  structural  model  of  behavior  and  social 
interaction.  Such a model  can be built  by  embedding  a  behavioral  model,  e.g.  the  Roy 
(1951) model of choice and consequences, in a general equilibrium framework. 
 




Identification of Macro Factors 
 
The  macro-decomposition  methods  reviewed  in  this  appendix  are  designed  to 
reveal  aggregate  factors  that  might  explain  variations  in  poverty  over  time  or  across 
socioeconomic groups.  As noted in the introduction, these macro methods rely on the same 
identification  strategy  as  the  micro  methods  discussed  in  the  main  text.    Each 
decomposition  method  is  characterized  mainly  by  the  nature  of  the  factors  it  seeks  to 
reveal  and  the  structure  of  the  relationship  it  assumes  between  the  focal  object  of 
decomposition and its determining factors.  The first group of methods we consider seek to 
account for changes in poverty in terms of changes in the mean and in relative inequality of 
the underlying outcome distribution.  We refer to the component associated with the mean 
as  the  size  effect.    The  one  associated  with  relative  inequality  will  be  called  the 
redistribution effect.  The second group of methods we examine here exploit the structure 
of additively decomposable poverty measures to characterize changes in poverty over time 
in terms of intrasectoral effects and effects stemming from population shifts. 
I. The Size and Redistribution Effects 
  There are two methods of decomposing variations in poverty outcome into the size 
and redistribution effects.  The first is a threefold decomposition that identifies a third 
component  as  an  indicator  of  the  interaction  between  the  two  main  effects  (size  and 
redistribution).  The second method, based on the Shapley value, involves no such term.  
We review both methods along with ways of simulating relevant counterfactual outcomes. 
A Threefold Decomposition 
Datt and Ravallion (1992) observe that poverty measures may be fully characterized by 
the  poverty  line,  z,  the  mean  of  the  distribution  of  economic  welfare,  μ,  and  relative 
inequality as represented by the Lorenz curve L.  When working with real income as an 
indicator of economic welfare, the poverty line is considered fixed so that we write the 52 
 
overall level of poverty at time t as a function only of mean income and the Lorenz function: 
                     .  The overall change in poverty from base period 0 to end period 1 
can be written as follows34. 
    
                                      (A.1) 
These  authors propose  a  threefold decomposition  procedure  that allows the  analyst  to 
express overall change in poverty in terms of a component linked to change in the mean 
only, another component associated with change in the Lorenz curve only and a residual 
which is in fact the interaction effect.  In particular, the size effect is the change in poverty 
due to a variation in the mean while the Lorenz curve is fixed at some reference level.  
Similarly, the redistribution effect is the change in poverty due to a change in the Lorenz 
curve while holding the mean at some reference level.  In principle, one could choose either 
the base period or the end period as reference.  However, Datt and Ravallion (1992) argue 
that the base period is a natural choice for the decomposition and conduct their analysis on 
that basis.  Within that framework, the size effect is equal to the following expression. 
    
                                      (A.2) 
Similarly, the redistribution effect is: 
    
                                      (A.3) 
  Note that these two expressions describe counterfactual outcomes.  The size effect 
entails distribution neutral growth (the Lorenz curve does not change).  The redistribution 
effect implies that growth is size neutral (the mean does not change). 
                                                           
34 According  to  the  logic  of  counterfactual  decomposition  discussed  in  the  text,               is  the 
outcome model underlying this decomposition.  It is a model of a social outcome and its 
expression is equivalent to             , in the notation we use in the text.  While we are 
focusing  here  on  poverty  outcomes,  it  is  important  to  note  that  these  decomposition 
methods apply as well to generic distributional statistics (social outcome indicators), which 
we can now express as              . 53 
 
To  obtain  the  Datt-Ravallion  decomposition,  we  can  add  and  subtract  these 
counterfactual outcomes to and from the right hand side of (A.1).  Upon rearranging terms 
we get the following. 
    
     
      
                                                       (A.4) 
The third term in brackets on the right hand side of (A.4) is the residual interpreted as the 
interaction effect.  It is the difference between two ways of computing the redistributive 
effect depending on whether one fixes the end period mean or the base period mean.  In 
other words, the residual is the difference between the redistribution effect computed on 
the basis of the end period mean and the same effect evaluated at the initial mean (Datt and 
Ravallion 1992, Ravallion 2000). 
  Interestingly,  we  can  rearrange  terms  within  the  residual  and  get  the  following 
equivalent expression. 
    
                                                        (A.5) 
This expression reveals that the residual is also equal to the difference between the size 
effect computed on the basis of the end period Lorenz curve and the same effect evaluated 
at the initial period Lorenz curve (Datt and Ravallion 1992, Ravallion 2000). 
  The structure of the residual revealed by equations (A.4) and (A.5) led Datt and 
Ravallion (1992) to interpret this residual as the interaction effect between the size and 
redistribution effects.  Indeed, if the size effect depends on the reference Lorenz curve or 
the redistribution effect on the reference mean, the residual would not equal zero.  Thus, as 
noted  by  Datt  and  Ravallion  (1992)  the  interaction  term  would  vanish  if  the  poverty 
measure is additively separable between μ and L35.  These authors also point out that the 
residual would vanish if one took the average of its components over the base and final 
years.  As it turns out, this is precisely the procedure proposed by Shorrocks(1999) based 
                                                           
35 Ravallion(2000) clarifies this point by noting that, in general, if a variable v is a function of two variables x 
and y and if this function is additively separable in x and y, then we can write: v=g(x) + h(y).  In these 
circumstances, the change in v when x changes holding y constant depends only on the initial and final values 
of x.  Without this additive separability, we should expect the variation in v to depend on the particular value 
of y chosen. 54 
 
on the Shapely value.  Kakwani (2000) proposes the same procedure, but does not refer to 
the Shapley value. 
A Twofold Decomposition Based on the Shapley Value 
The Shapley value provides a formula for dividing a joint cost or a jointly produced 
output on the basis of a fair assessment of individual contributions to the formation of total 
cost or the production of a surplus.  Thus, it can be viewed as an interpretation of the 
reward principle of distributive justice (Moulin 2003)36.  Formally, the Shapley value is a 
solution to a cooperative game.   The problem of the commons is used often to explain the 
nature of such games.  A commons is a technology that is jointly owned and operated by a 
group of agents.  Young(1994) provides the following definition of the Shapley value in the 
case of cost sharing. 
“Given a cost-sharing game on a fixed set of players, let the players join the cooperative enterprise one at 
a time in some predetermined order.  As each player joins, the number of players to be served increases.  
The player’s cost contribution is his net addition to cost when he joins, that is, the incremental cost of 
adding him to the group of players who have already joined.  The Shapley value of a player is his average 
cost contribution over all possible orderings of the players.” 
  To see how the above principle translates into a decomposition procedure, consider 
a  distributional  statistic  such  as  the  overall  level  of  poverty  or  inequality.    Let  it  be  a 
function of m contributory factors which together account for the value of the indicator.  
The decomposition approach proposed by Shorrocks (1999) is based on the marginal effect 
on  the  value  of  the  indicator  resulting  from  eliminating  sequentially  each  of  the 
contributory factors  and computing the  corresponding marginal  change  in the  statistic.  
                                                           
36 Moulin (2003) argues that the concept of fairness can be interpreted in terms of four basic ideas: exogenous 
rights, compensation, reward and fitness.  An exogenous right is a normative postulate that dictates how a 
resource must be distributed among claimants.  Equal treatment of equals is an example of such a postulate.  
In general, exogenous rights set claims to resources independently of the use of such resources and of the 
contribution to their production while compensation and reward relate fairness to individual characteristics 
relevant  to  the  use  or  production  of  the  resources  under  consideration.    The  compensation  principle 
advocates giving extra resources to people who find themselves in unfortunate circumstances for which they 
cannot be held (morally) responsible.  The reward principle bases allocation on individual behavior to the 
extent that it affects the overall burden or advantage under distribution.  Finally, according to the fitness 
principle, resources must go to the person who can make the best use of them. 55 
 
The method then assigns to each factor the average of its marginal contributions in all 
possible elimination sequences. 
  The Shapley decomposition rule respects the following restrictions: (1) Symmetry or 
anonymity, meaning the contribution assigned to any factor should not depend on its label 
or the way it is listed; (2) the result must be an exact and additive decomposition; and (3) 
the contribution of each factor is taken to be equal to its (first round) marginal impact. 
  To see how this logic applies to the decomposition of change in poverty over time 
into  a  size  and  a  redistribution  effect  with  no  residual,  rewrite  equation  (A.1)  in  the 
following form: 
    
                             (A.6) 
In  other  words  the  overall  change  in  poverty  is  fully  determined  by  two  contributory 
factors37, namely the change in the mean of the distribution              and the change in 
the Lorenz curve             .  As can be seen in the case of the Datt-Ravallion method, the 
value of any effect (size or redistribution) depends on the chosen period of reference.  This 
path-dependence violates the anonymity constraint that the Shapley method must respect.  
We therefore need to consider all possible sequences of elimination and the associated 
marginal contributions that must be averaged in the end.  In this simple case, we have only 
two possible sequences: either we eliminate the size factor first by setting       , then the 
redistribution factor by setting       , or we start with the redistribution factor to end 
with the size factor. 
  Consider eliminating the size factor first.  Then the change in poverty would be: 
                                             (A.7) 
It is clear from expression (A.7) that this change is attributed to the redistribution factor.  
Given  that  the  decomposition  must  be  exhaustive  and  additive,  the  corresponding  size 
effect is equal to the following. 
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                                           (A.8) 
For the alternative sequence, we eliminate the redistribution factor first so that the change 
in poverty becomes: 
                                             (A.9) 
This is the left over contribution of the size factor.  The corresponding contribution of the 
redistribution factor is: 
    
     
                                           (A.10) 
The Shapley contribution of the size factor to change in poverty is equal to the average 
(over the two possible elimination sequences) of the relevant marginal contributions.  That 
is: 
      
 
                                                       (A.11) 
  Similarly, the Shapley contribution of the redistribution factor to change in poverty 
is equal to: 
      
 
                                                       (A.12) 
  While  our  discussion  so  far  has  focused  on  variation  in  poverty  over  time,  it  is 
important to note that the Shapley method is applicable to the analysis of differences in 
poverty across space.  Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2005) use the Shapley rule to decompose 
regional differences in poverty in Russia, working both with real and nominal incomes38.  
In the context of spatial decomposition, these authors refer to the size effect as the  income 
effect.  Furthermore, the base period must now be interpreted as a reference region which 
could be the whole country or the capital city for instance.  An interesting feature of the 
case study of Russia is the fact that Kolenikov and Shorrocks (2005) present a threefold 
decomposition of change in poverty in terms of effects associated with changes in nominal 
income, inequality and poverty line.  The latter represents the regional price effect.  In that 
                                                           
38 Essama-Nssah and Bassole (2010) use the same method to analyze regional disparity in Cameroon. 57 
 
case, relevant poverty measures are written as:          where z stands for the poverty 
line. 
  Recall equations (28) and (29) from section 3.  These two equations reveal that, for 
the class of additively separable poverty measures, the change in poverty can be written as 
a function of the growth incidence curve (GIC) and therefore inherits the decomposability 
of  that  curve.    Using  the  neutral element  for  addition,  one  can  split  the  GIC  into  one 
component showing the growth rate of average income and another showing the deviation 
of each point on the curve from the overall growth rate.  Formally, we write: 
                                         (A.13) 
The first component is the rate of growth that would be experienced at every quantile if the 
growth process were distribution neutral.  This is essentially the size effect.  It can be 
shown that the second component is equal to the change in the slope of the Lorenz curve 
between  the  base  and  end  period  (Ravallion  and  Chen  2003).    Thus,  this  component 
measures the redistribution effect.  The corresponding Shapley decomposition of change in 
poverty is: 
    
  
 
               
     
 
                          
            (A.14) 
This decomposition carries over to the elasticity of poverty with respect to the average 
income.  To see this, just normalize expression (A.14) by γP. 
Simulating Relevant Counterfactual Outcomes 
  The  implementation  of  the  above  decomposition  methods  requires  ways  of 
estimating the underpinning counterfactual distributions.  The selection of an estimation 
approach depends on the structure of the available data. 
If one is using household or individual level data, scaling up the initial distribution 
by  a  factor  equal  to  the  ratio 
  
  
 produces  a  counterfactual  distribution  with  the  same 
Lorenz curve as the initial distribution and the same mean as the end period distribution.  
This is a distribution neutral transformation that leads to the computation of the following 58 
 
counterfactual outcome:         .  Similarly, the computation of          entails scaling 




If  instead  one  has  only  aggregate  data,  say  outcome  distribution  by  quintile  or 
decile, then one can simulate these counterfactuals on the basis of a parameterized Lorenz 
function (Datt 1998).  To see what is involved, we recall the definition and structure of the 
Lorenz curve and discuss its parameterization based on the general quadratic model.  The 
informational content of a cumulative distribution function (CDF) can be encoded into a 
Lorenz  function.    Rank  all  individuals  in  ascending  order  of  the  outcome  variable  (e.g. 
indicator of living standard).  Let p stand for the 100p percent of the population with the 
lowest outcome values, and L(p) the share of the total outcome value going to that segment 
of the population.  The Lorenz curve maps the cumulative proportion p on the horizontal 
axis against the cumulative share L(p) on the vertical axis for all p in [0, 1]. 
  Let  y  be  the  focal  variable  with  density  function  f(y)  and  distribution       
        
 
  .  The latter represents the proportion, p, of the population with an outcome 
value less than or equal to z.  The corresponding cumulative share is:         
 
       
 
  , 
where μ is the average outcome.  By definition,            .  Therefore, the cumulative 
share can also be written as         
    
    
 
  .  This is the Lorenz function.  Its first order 
derivative  is  equal  to        
    
  ,  and  the  second  order  derivative  is        
 
      (see 
Lambert 2001 for details).  These two derivatives reveal that we can recover the quantile 
or the level of the outcome variable from the information contained in the mean and the 
first order derivative.  Similarly we can recover the density function from the mean and the 
second order derivative. 
  For  the  general  quadratic  Lorenz  model,  the  Lorenz  ordinate  is  given  by  the 
following expression (Datt 1998). 
          
 
                           
 
              (A.15) 
The corresponding first order derivative is equal to: 59 
 
           
  
   
     
                           (A.16) 
And the second order derivative is: 
         
             
  
 
                  (A.17) 
The parameters characterizing the general quadratic Lorenz model are defined as 
follows:                         where   ,   ,  and    are  the  coefficients  from  the 
regression  of              on      –    ,               and           without  an  intercept.  
Furthermore,  Datt  (1998)  explains  that  one  must  drop  the  last  observation  since  the 
chosen functional form forces the curve to go through (1, 1).  With this parameterization, 
one can perform the counterfactual decomposition described in equation (A.4) or the one 
implied  by  equations  (A.11)  and  (A.12)  by  combining  the  relevant  means  and  Lorenz 
functions.  For instance, the computation of the counterfactual social outcome          is 
based  on  the  following  elemental  inputs:   ,   
      and   
     .    The  corresponding 
counterfactual outcomes are estimated by the following expression: 
     
               
                      (A.18) 
The corresponding value of the density function is equal to: 
      
       
 
     
                       (A.19) 
The same logic applies for the estimation of the other counterfactual,         . 
Most distributional statistics can be computed on the basis of the information on the 
outcome  variable  y  and  the  corresponding  density  function.    In  that  context,        is 
interpreted as the proportion of people whose outcome lies in the close interval        for 
an outcome level   and an infinitesimal change    (Lambert 2001). 
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Decomposing Differences in the Generalized Lorenz Ordinates 
Finally,  note  that  one  can  use  the  Shapley  method  to  decompose  changes  in  a 
generalized Lorenz curve39 across quantiles into  a size effect and a redistribution effect, 
and infer the poverty implications of these distributional changes (Sotelsek -Salem et al. 
2011).  The generalized Lorenz curve is equal to the ordinary Lorenz curve defined above 
multiplied by the mean of the corresponding distribution.  Formally, we write:  
                          
 
                         (A.20) 
The generalized Lorenz curve is a social evaluation function that respects both the Pareto 
principle (more is preferred to less) and the Pigou-Dalton transfer principle (more equality 
in the outcome distribution is preferred to less).  On the basis of these value judgments, 
social  welfare  will  improve  as  we  move  from  the  baseline  distribution  (t=0)  to  the 
posterior distribution (t=1), if the generalized Lorenz curve associated with the posterior 
distribution lies nowhere below that of the baseline distribution.  This condition is known 
as second order dominance. 
  One can base pro-poor judgments on this dominance relation.  For instance, Duclos 
(2009)  explains  that,  within  the  relative  approach  to  poverty-focused  evaluation,  a 
distributional change that benefits (harms) the poor more (less) than the non-poor must be 
considered pro-poor40.  We may denote a relative pro-poor standard by (1+ρ) to indicate 
the  change  in the  living standards  society would like  the  poor to experience  given  the 
overall distributional change.  If this standard is set to the ratio of the mean of the posterior 
distribution to that of the baseline distribution, then a pro-poor change should increase the 
outcomes of the poor in proportion to the change in the overall mean outcome.  Second-
order  pro-poor  judgments  based  on  generalized  Lorenz  dominance  can  be  stated  as 
follows. 
                                                           (A.21) 
                                                           
39 Not to be confused with the general quadratic model of the Lorenz curve. 
40 If one chooses an absolute standard of evaluation, then a pro-poor change increases the poor’s absolute 
standard of living. 61 
 
Where  F1(∙)  is  the  posterior  distribution  function  and  zmax  the  maximum  level  of  the 
poverty line.  When the relative standard is set to the ratio of the outcome means, then 
condition  (A.21)  is  equivalent  to  having  the  Lorenz  curve  of  the  posterior  distribution 
located above that of the baseline distribution over the relevant range of p. 
  Given  the  overall  judgment  represented  by  (A.21),  one  might  be  interested  in 
identifying the contribution of the size effect and that of the redistribution effect into that 
overall change.  The left-hand side of (A.21) can be written as follows. 
                                          (A.22) 
Following the same logic as in the case of poverty measures, we compute the size effect as: 
           
 
                                                (A.23) 
The corresponding redistribution effect is: 
           
 
                                                (A.24) 
  Atkinson (1987) establishes a relationship between second order dominance and 
poverty reduction.  In particular, he proves that if           , then we know that posterior  
outcome distribution has less poverty than the baseline distribution for all poverty lines 
and all poverty measures defined by equation (27) in the text that respect the transfer 
principle.  This provides us with a basis for tracking the poverty implications of the size 
effect or the redistribution effect.  By definition,                            .  In other 
word, the ordinates of the end-period generalized Lorenz curve are obtained by adding the 
difference in ordinates to the corresponding ordinates of the baseline generalized Lorenz 
curve.  Following Sotelsek-Salem et al. (2011), instead of adding the total difference, we 
add only the redistribution effect to obtain the following intermediate generalized Lorenz 
curve. 
                                            (A.25) 62 
 
If this intermediate curve dominates the baseline curve, in order words if the redistribution 
effect is positive for all p, then the redistribution effect reduces poverty as measured by all 
members of the additively separable class that respect the transfer principle. 
  Note that the pro-poor test presented in (A.21) can be restated as follows. 
                                                         (A.26) 
This  suggests  that  the  redistribution  effect  will  be  relatively  pro-poor  if  the  following 
condition holds. 
                                                         (A.27) 
In other words, 
       
                                    .  This test for second-order relative 
pro-poorness entails a comparison of growth rates of the cumulative income of proportions 
p of the poorest to the standard rate ρ.  An equivalent test is based on the so-called three I’s 
of  poverty  (TIP)  curve  of  Jenkins  and  Lambert  (1997),  which  is  obtained  by  partially 
cumulating individual contributions to overall poverty from the poorest individual to the 
richest, and normalizing. 
II. Within-Group and Population Shift Effects 
  The  application  of  the  decomposition  methods  described  above  to  the  class  of 
additively decomposable poverty measures allows the analyst to decompose changes in 
poverty over time into an effect due to changes in within-group poverty and another due to 
population shifts.  Let the total population of a given country be partitioned exhaustively 
into m socioeconomic groups.  Let wkt be the share of population in group k at time t for 
t=0,  1,  and  Pkt  the  level  of  poverty  in  that  group  at  the  same  time.  For  additively 
decomposable poverty measures, overall poverty at time t can be written as follows. 
               
 
                      (A.28) 
The change in aggregate poverty over time can now be written as follows. 
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At this stage, we are interested in accounting for the overall change in poverty   
  in terms 
of changes in within group poverty,                , and the population shifts between 
groups,                .  We  note  that  the  contribution  of  group  k  in  the  change  of 
aggregate poverty is equal to the following expression. 
                                      (A.30) 
If the population share of this group were fixed at the baseline level, the contribution of this 
group  to  overall  poverty  change  would  be       .    We  can  add  and  subtract  this 
counterfactual  to  (A.30),  rearrange  terms  and  sum  over  k.    We  get  the  following 
decomposition presented in Bourguignon and Ferreira (2005). 
    
                      
 
   
 
                  (A.31) 
According to (A.31) the overall change in poverty can be split into two components, one 
representing  the  contribution  of  changes  in  within-group  poverty  and  the  other  is  the 
contribution of population shifts. 
  It is possible to further transform this twofold decomposition as follows.  Consider 
the counterfactual where within group poverty does not change.  On the basis of equation 
(A.31), the contribution of group k to change in poverty can be written as: 
                                                  (A.32) 
Fixing group level poverty at the base level reduces this contribution to:                
We can add and subtract this counterfactual to and from equation (A.32), rearrange terms 
and sum up over k to get the threefold decomposition proposed by Ravallion and Huppi 
(1991) 
    
                      
 
              
 
   
 
            (A.33) 
Equation (A.33) shows that change in aggregate poverty over time can be decomposed in 
three  components  representing  respectively:  within-group  effects,  the  effect  associated 
with population shifts and interaction effects. 64 
 
Shorrocks (1999) also shows that the Shapley principle applies to this situation as 
well and leads to the following twofold decomposition of change in aggregate poverty over 
time. 
          
       
      
 
         
       
      
 
              (A.34) 
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